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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Both legislatures and administrative agencies often act in the face 
of scientific uncertainty in matters ranging from criminal punish-
ment1 to environmental protection2 to food labeling and safety regu-
lations3 to health care regulation.4  When disputes arise regarding the 
scientific support for these actions, courts must struggle to determine 
either the science relevant to the dispute, or determine the appropri-
ate institution to make that scientific determination.  Judicial resolu-
tions may therefore involve laying out default approaches for further 
inquiry into the matter by courts, or rules for deference to other insti-
tutions, or some combination of the two.  Such resolutions can be es-
 
 1 See, e.g., Eric S. Janus, The Use of Social Science and Medicine in Sex Offender Commitment, 23 
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 347, 369 (1997). 
 2 See, e.g., David E. Adelman, The Art of the Unsolvable:  Locating the Vital Center of Science for 
Environmental Law & Policy, 37 ENVTL. L. 935, 936–37 (2007) (“Issues ranging from the 
toxicity of industrial chemicals to the protection of endangered species and the projected 
magnitude of global warming transcend existing scientific knowledge.”); Alyson C. Flour-
noy, Legislating Inaction:  Asking the Wrong Questions in Protective Environmental Decisionmak-
ing, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 327, 327–28 (1991) (discussing how the presence of scien-
tific uncertainties can create barriers to protective environmental decisionmaking); 
Judith Jones, Regulatory Design for Scientific Uncertainty:  Acknowledging the Diversity of Ap-
proaches in Environmental Regulation and Public Administration, 19 J. ENVTL. L. 347, 348 
(2007) (listing seven different approaches for dealing with the existence of scientific un-
certainty in designing environmental regulations); Vern R. Walker, The Myth of Science as a 
“Neutral Arbiter” for Triggering Precautions, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 197, 203 (2003) 
(“[E]ven scientific evidence about causation, of the kind used to warrant a finding of risk, 
necessarily involves several distinct types of uncertainty.  Scientists sometimes can reduce 
the levels of such uncertainties, but they can never eliminate those uncertainties alto-
gether.”). 
 3 See, e.g., Scott D. Deatherage, Scientific Uncertainty in Regulating Deliberate Release of Geneti-
cally Engineered Organisms:  Substantive Judicial Review and Institutional Alternatives, 11 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 204 (1987) (“[U]ncertainty about the risks of releasing genetically 
engineered material into the environment is perhaps the key element of the prob-
lem . . . . [in evaluating] what regulatory mechanisms are best suited for deliberate re-
lease decision making.”); Mara A. Michaels, Comment, FDA Regulation of Health Claims 
Under the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990:  A Proposal for a Less Restrictive Scien-
tific Standard, 44 EMORY L.J. 319, 328 (1995) (noting that “the public can understand the 
need for a policy of public protection in the face of scientific uncertainty” as to the safety 
of foods). 
 4 See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 288 (2003) 
(explaining that scientific uncertainty in part causes “[i]ndeterminacy about what maxi-
mizes welfare [that] pervades medical practice and health care policy”). 
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pecially complicated where statutory challenges arise facially because 
the science before courts can involve legislative facts beyond those 
concerning the immediate parties in the case,5 given that formal fac-
tual records may not exist in such situations.6 
This Article examines the Supreme Court’s response to scientific 
uncertainty in the context of facial statutory challenges where the sci-
entific support for those statutes is questioned.  In doing so, I will use 
the lens of Gonzales v. Carhart (“Carhart II”),7 in which the majority 
suggested that the Court will give heightened deference to legislative 
choices when the legislature is acting in areas of medical and scien-
tific uncertainty.  In Carhart II, the majority deferred (though not 
“uncritical[ly]”)8 to Congress’s decision to restrict a medical proce-
dure called intact dilation and extraction, or D & X, in the face of 
medical uncertainty, given that the Court found documented medical 
disagreement about whether the prohibited abortion method would 
cause serious health risks to women.9  Providing greater deference to 
legislatures acting in areas of scientific uncertainty suggests that legis-
lative discretion would be curtailed were scientific certainty to be es-
tablished.  I will abstract from Carhart II, and the cases from which it 
draws support, differences between what the Court suggests might 
change were scientific certainty present, and what the actual practical 
effect of having scientific knowledge might be.10 
I will suggest that such heightened deference may have the posi-
tive effect of giving room for legislatures to act in areas where scien-
tific and medical knowledge is still in development, a context that 
applies to many contemporary areas of environmental and public 
health risks.  Whether these positive effects outweigh potential prob-
lems of legislative deference, such as institutional bias and scientific 
capacity, is far from clear.  Indeed, the appropriateness of legislative 
 
 5 See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 
HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942) (distinguishing legislative facts, which inform legislative 
judgment, from adjudicative facts, which concern the immediate parties before the 
court). 
 6 See Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality:  The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Funda-
mental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 698–700 (1988) (describing how in facial challenges, 
“critical legislative facts often are assumed, judicially noticed, or determined a priori by 
logic or reference to judicial precedent”). 
 7 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
 8 Id. at 1638. 
 9 Id. at 1636–37. 
 10 For a comprehensive discussion of the Supreme Court’s constitutional approach toward 
medical treatments, including that taken in Carhart II, see B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional 
Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions:  A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277 
(2007). 
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deference may be quite dependent on the particular type of risk be-
ing tackled by the legislature, the complexity and availability of in-
formation about that risk, and the types of stakeholders involved in 
managing the risk11—concerns glossed over by the majority in Carhart 
II. 
Moreover, I will observe that the use of dual judicial review 
modes—one in the presence of scientific certainty, another in the ab-
sence of scientific certainty—masks a less explicit, but nevertheless 
underlying, determination:  the judicial inquiry into whether the sci-
ence is “certain” or “uncertain.”  This legal inquiry into the existence 
of uncertainty is not as easy a question for a court to answer as it 
might seem, given that the determination of certainty involves both 
reaching a certain level of scientific understanding and making nor-
mative judgments about the nature of science.  But, because the an-
swer to this question may act as a gateway between areas of more gov-
ernment options and areas of fewer government options, I suggest 
that courts should pay deeper attention to how they answer this ques-
tion, both in individual cases and as a general matter.  The majority 
in Carhart II did not provide such guidance.  Instead, the majority 
created further confusion by making its own finding of scientific un-
certainty sufficient to warrant legislative deference despite congres-
sional findings of certainty, thereby usurping a political determina-
tion more legitimately left to legislatures. 
This Article will also examine the possible implications of the def-
erential approach for the production and communication of scien-
tific research.  In particular, I suggest that even if the actual practical 
effect on legal decisions is limited, the fact that the Court purports to 
change its review in light of the presence or absence of scientific cer-
tainty may affect the production of scientific research and limit op-
portunities for further dialogue between courts and scientists.  Such 
an effect, albeit indirect, is cause for some caution on the part of 
courts in defining approaches for dealing with statutory challenges 
involving scientific uncertainty.  Although such caution need not be 
determinative, courts should be aware of the impact that their deci-
sions may have on creating incentives for bias in the production and 
communication of scientific research, as well as their own capacities 
for assessing such bias.12 
 
 11 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 71–75 (1994). 
 12 See id. at 140–41. 
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Finally, in light of the Court’s approach of legislative deference in 
the face of scientific uncertainty, I will suggest some guiding princi-
ples to aid in evaluating whether such “certainty” exists, at least for 
the purpose of judicial review, to reduce the incentives for bias in sci-
entific research and to enhance, not diminish, dialogue between 
courts, legislatures, and the scientific community.  To provide such 
suggestions, I will draw from the Court’s own approaches in reviewing 
decisions made by federal agencies in the face of scientific uncertain-
ties.  In particular, I will argue that an articulation approach—similar 
to but far more limited than the approach in the regulatory review 
context—holds much promise for courts in evaluating whether the 
presence of scientific uncertainty is sufficient to warrant legislative 
deference.  By providing heightened deference only when the legisla-
ture has articulated that it is acting in the face of scientific uncer-
tainty, rather than allowing it to claim that scientific certainty man-
dates a particular action, courts can shift these politically shaped 
determinations back to the legislative arena, rather than either allow-
ing legislatures to take advantage of science’s appearance of objectiv-
ity or exposing courts to making such political determinations. 
II.  CATEGORIES OF SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTIES 
A.  Uncertainty in the “Objective” Scientific Context 
Scientific uncertainties pervade a number of areas in which legis-
latures and administrative agencies must act.  In environmental and 
natural resource regulation, for example, Holly Doremus has de-
scribed “[u]ncertainty [as] the unifying hallmark.”13  Public health, 
likewise, presents an area rife with scientific uncertainties, where de-
cisionmakers must often address emerging health risks despite lack of 
sufficient prior research, or face disastrous health effects.14  Indeed, as 
philosophers of science Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper have ob-
 
 13 Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource Manage-
ment, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 548 (2007); see also John C. Dernbach, The Unfocused Regula-
tion of Toxic and Hazardous Pollutants, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 45–46 (1997) (describing 
how risk assessment inherently involves uncertainties in predicting health effects); Flour-
noy, supra note 2, at 333–38 (1991) (describing difficulties in risk assessment processes 
that lead to scientific uncertainties). 
 14 See, e.g., Jason W. Sapsin et al., SARS and International Legal Preparedness, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 
155, 155–56 (2004) (explaining that the “relatively rapid dissemination [of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome, or SARS] across the globe left biomedical researchers and public 
health authorities struggling to maintain pace with the disease in the face of scientific un-
certainties and difficult policy choices”). 
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served, to some extent the very nature of science can be characterized 
as uncertain because scientific theories are either underdetermina-
tive,15 or are never fully consistent with all the available evidence.16  
Though the nature and degree of uncertainties may vary depending 
upon the given situation, the fact that much of scientific research can 
be characterized as “uncertain” should caution courts from taking a 
one-size-fits-all approach to inquiries regarding the “existence” or 
“non-existence” of scientific uncertainties.17 
Although courts use the term “scientific uncertainty” to refer to a 
number of areas in which science is unresolved, either through an 
agreed-upon lack of certitude about the scientific findings or through 
a disagreement among scientists about the findings,18 this broad use 
of the term masks the wide variety of situations in which the science 
can be described as “uncertain,” either epistemologically, or for the 
purpose of judicial, legislative, or regulatory resolution.  As one 
analysis has stated, “[t]he variety of types and sources of uncertainty, 
along with the lack of agreed terminology, can generate considerable 
confusion.”19  This confusion can be especially profound because of 
the divergence in judicial and scientific uses of the term.  Scientists, 
especially in the area of risk assessment, focus more on uncertainties 
in scientific research—or “knowledge uncertainty,” as some commen-
tators have described it20—and less on the presence of controversies 
between scientists or sets of scientists.21  Courts, however, also often 
use the term “uncertainty” to include areas where significant dis-
 
 15 See KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 64–77, 108–11 (1959). 
 16 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION:  SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC 
TRADITION AND CHANGE 240-65 (1977); see also David E. Adelman, Scientific Activism and 
Restraint:  The Interplay of Statistics, Judgment, and Procedure in Environmental Law, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 497, 531 (2004) (applying Popper’s and Kuhn’s theories to existing debates 
within the legal community about scientific evidence). 
 17 Cf. Flournoy, supra note 2, at 386–87 (criticizing the “binary” approach taken in many 
environmental statutes, and stating that “[d]etermining whether a substance or activity 
causes harm, or whether a standard protects public health, is not necessarily a yes or no 
question; doubt may preclude a decision”). 
 18 See, e.g., Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1636 (2007); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 
1444 (2007). 
 19 M. GRANGER MORGAN & MAX HENRION, UNCERTAINTY:  A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH 
UNCERTAINTY IN QUANTITATIVE RISK AND POLICY ANALYSIS 47 (1990). 
 20 See Flournoy, supra note 2, at 388–89 (“For cases in which the source of doubt is knowledge 
uncertainty, the agency might regulate notwithstanding the uncertainty, especially if the 
threatened harm was severe, or regulation might be abandoned.”). 
 21 See ALAN KRUPNICK ET AL., NOT A SURE THING:  MAKING REGULATORY CHOICES UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 5-75 (2006) (discussing various types of uncertainty that play into risk 
analysis); Walker, supra note 2, at 204–11 (describing a similar typology of scientific un-
certainties). 
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agreement exists on particular scientific findings—or “controversy 
uncertainty,” as I will call this use of the term “uncertainty.”22 
Moreover, even those discussions of knowledge uncertainty within 
scientific research can be quite wide-ranging.  One recent attempt at 
providing a typology, based on a survey of the previous literature, dis-
cusses several categories:  “parameter uncertainty,” “model uncer-
tainty,” “variability,” and “decision uncertainty.”23  Although uncer-
tainties of multiple categories may be present in a given 
legal/scientific problem, each category also poses somewhat distinct 
implications for using science in a legal or policy decisionmaking 
model. 
Parameter uncertainty, also referred to as epistemological or 
knowledge-based uncertainty, arises in factors that are measurable in 
principle, but nevertheless are uncertain through problems of meas-
urement or diagnosis.24  These can be further broken down into cate-
gories such as measurement uncertainty, conflicting or absent data, 
and extrapolation errors or misclassification.25  Take, for example, the 
scientific research involved in deciding whether to allow or require a 
certain vaccine.  Parameter uncertainties could arise from difficulties 
in measuring the response rate of individuals; the absence of tests on 
a specific population of individuals; difficulties in determining overall 
presence of a disease given a limited sample size; and problems in 
categorizing the immunoresponses observed by medical profession-
als.  These uncertainties may confound legal or policy decisions to 
distribute or require a certain vaccine, but may be resolved through 
further research that better reaches a state of “certainty.”  Thus, a de-
cisionmaker may be faced with not only the question of whether to 
permanently allow or disallow a certain vaccine, but also the addi-
tional question of whether to act upon a problem now or await future 
research, taking into account the opportunity cost of delay. 
Model uncertainty, another epistemic uncertainty, involves uncer-
tainty about the nature of the system itself.26  Model uncertainty can 
 
 22 See generally Charles Weiss, Expressing Scientific Uncertainty, 2 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 25 
(2003) (discussing scientific uncertainties in legal disputes and suggesting a lay nomen-
clature for various degrees of uncertainty). 
 23 KRUPNICK, supra note 21, at 9–24. 
 24 Id. at 13–14; see also Walker, supra note 2, at 206–09 (breaking down parameter uncer-
tainty into those involving uncertainties in measurements and uncertainties in sampling). 
 25 KRUPNICK, supra note 21, at 14–17. 
 26 Id. at 17–18; see also Adelman, supra note 2, at 942–46 (discussing model uncertainty in 
toxic risk assessments); Walker, supra note 2, at 205–06, 209–11 (breaking down what is 
described in this Article as model uncertainty into “conceptual uncertainty,” which relates 
to uncertainty in choice of variables, “modeling uncertainty,” which are assumptions 
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arise from uncertainty in the structure chosen to describe a system, 
oversimplification of the model itself, or the failure of the model to 
take into account certain factors in describing a given system.27  In the 
vaccine example, this could involve uncertainty in the transmission 
model for a disease, oversimplification in the communication path-
way used in the model, or the failure to acknowledge (or even be 
aware of) alternative pathways for that model.  Again, decisionmakers 
will be faced with the tradeoff between making an immediate deci-
sion (to allow or require the immunization, or never to allow it), or to 
await further research to establish “certainty” (with its ensuing oppor-
tunity costs). 
Variability uncertainty, sometimes referred to as ontological or 
stochastic uncertainty, involves uncertainty arising from natural or 
inherent heterogeneity in the state of the system being studied.28  
Again, in the vaccine example, variability uncertainty could arise in 
the scientific evaluation of the effectiveness of the vaccine in different 
communities.  Natural variations may exist in how different individu-
als in a given population respond to that vaccination.  Most individu-
als might develop the responding immunity for which the vaccine was 
designed; some might develop only partial immunity; a few might be 
immunocompromised and thus be unable to develop any immunity 
at all; and others might respond with anaphylactic shock.  Moreover, 
different communities might have different types of individuals in 
different proportions.  Such variability in the population, therefore, 
can lead to scientific uncertainty in the evaluation of the vaccine’s ef-
fectiveness. 
Unlike other types of uncertainties, variability uncertainty is the 
sort of uncertainty that may not be reduced through further scientific 
research because it derives from natural or inherent variations in the 
system being studied, rather than uncertainties in diagnosing the ac-
tual responses or developing an accurate immunoresponse model.  
Thus, in this context, certainty may never be established, and any le-
gal or policy decision may involve having to assume or defer to as-
sumptions about a given distribution of individuals (unless every sin-
gle individual were actually to be tested).  This does not mean, 
however, that the uncertainty cannot be better characterized.  But it 
does mean that uncertainties will still remain unless every single 
 
made by the model once the variables are chosen, and “causal uncertainty,” which is un-
certainty in what events cause others). 
 27 KRUPNICK, supra note 21, at 18–19. 
 28 Id. at 11–13. 
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member of a given variable set is tested, which would be technically 
unfeasible. 
Finally, decision uncertainty, also called value uncertainty, arises 
when uncertainties in normative choices, as is often the case in policy-
relevant science, factor into the methodology chosen in the course of 
scientific research.29  Decision uncertainty does not refer to normative 
uncertainty involving the values of actions themselves (although it 
could lead to that), but rather to uncertainties in the value factors 
that shape the scientific research.  Returning to the vaccine example, 
normative uncertainties can, for example, arise in research decisions 
to explicitly model exposures faced by the least well-off, or to treat all 
exposures equally, regardless of the nature of those likely to face 
those exposures.  They might also involve decisions to count only fa-
talities as negative events, or to also include chronic effects that may 
impair, but not kill, an individual, or to place greater weight on 
avoiding certain types of risks versus others.  To some degree, addi-
tional research can help clarify the extent of these effects and their 
distribution through the development of finer and more exact prob-
abilistic models, but uncertainty will always be present to the extent 
that the normative beliefs of both decisionmakers and the people 
they represent regarding the importance of possible decisionmaking 
factors are diverse.30  “Certainty” in this context may never be resolved 
unless the decisionsmakers—or the public—reach some consensus 
on the normative values to be incorporated into the research assump-
tions themselves. 
All of these types of scientific uncertainty can impact the ultimate 
validity of a particular legal or policy decision.31  For example, para-
 
 29 Id. at 20–22; see also Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1622–27 (1995) (describing numerous “trans-scientific” questions 
at each stage of a risk assessment process).  Although Professor Wagner argues that these 
questions should ultimately be separated in the context of agency risk assessments, id. at 
1701–18, such separation may be unfeasible for legislative science, where legislatures ar-
guably have fewer expert resources devoted to them than do agencies. 
 30 See KRUPNICK, supra note 27, at 22. 
 31 See Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process:  A Primer for Triers of Sci-
ence, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563, 1596 (2000) (discussing how, even in common law tort cases, 
opposing experts may disagree yet offer scientifically valid hypotheses); Flournoy, supra 
note 2, at 365 (describing how scientific disagreement could stem from divergent “judg-
ments [that] a scientist must make, including decisions about which experiments to per-
form, decisions about whether to adopt more or less conservative assumptions in calcula-
tions, and inferences to be drawn from the data”). 
   This is not to suggest that science alone can determine a legal or policy decision.  In 
the risk assessment literature, for example, others have frequently observed that scientific 
uncertainties mean that policy decisions are always influenced by normative considera-
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metric uncertainties may call into question the decision to require a 
vaccine, given a high degree of uncertainty about its safety and the 
likelihood that further development of that vaccine would resolve 
those safety issues.  Variability uncertainty may entail making certain 
demographic or distributional assumptions about the particular 
population exposed to a disease, but may also require more transpar-
ency for those decisions to be considered valid.  Likewise, decision 
uncertainty may require the decisionmaker to explicitly set forth the 
choices of normative assumptions made in the research, such as 
whether or not chronic effects are modeled. 
B.  Uncertainty in the Context of Controversy and Bias 
In contrast to the discussion of uncertainty within the scientific 
community, when courts, including the Supreme Court, refer to un-
certainty, they more often refer to areas in which there is disagree-
ment among experts regarding the actual science on a particular 
point.32  It is helpful, however, to explore the relationship between 
controversy and uncertainty to better understand their distinctions 
and overlaps.  Disagreement may not always connote uncertainty in 
the sense described earlier; for example, one study might conclude—
in all “certainty”—that a particular vaccine would only harm a few in-
dividuals, while another study might conclude—again with “cer-
tainty”—that the risks are fairly significant.33  Moreover, courts may 
encounter controversy over the existence of uncertainty itself; one 
study might conclude that the science is well-established through 
measurements and models, while another study might point to nu-
merous uncertainties involving measurements and data gaps. 
Scientific disagreement may arise from the differing types of “ob-
jective” scientific uncertainties described earlier.  But differing scien-
 
tions.  See Walker, supra note 2, at 198.  Even the evaluation of whether an event is “ad-
verse” under a statutory directive, for example, entails an inquiry into what counts as a 
benefit and what counts as a cost.  See id. at 199–200. 
 32 See Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1636 (2007).  Although this Article bifurcates uncertainty 
into “knowledge uncertainty” and “controversy uncertainty” for the purpose of providing 
a clearer typology, in a Bayesian sense, these two sorts of uncertainties could be merged 
into one single approach towards uncertainty given that “[p]robability and scientific 
judgment are merged for Bayesians because they treat probability as a subjective property 
that incorporates subjective judgments directly into probability estimates.”  Adelman, su-
pra note 16, at 508–15 (describing differences between traditional “frequentist” ap-
proaches and Bayesian approaches towards statistics).  A full discussion of these differ-
ences is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 33 Cf. Wagner, supra note 29, at 1639 (describing “wildly different ‘scientific conclusions’” 
reached by different federal agencies regarding the same questions). 
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tific opinions may also arise from bias in the production of science.34  
By this, I do not mean that researchers are deliberately skewing their 
explorations towards a certain result, although this has been docu-
mented.35  Rather, funding pressures might create what science policy 
scholar Sheldon Krimsky has deemed an “evolutionary pressure that 
steers the research toward the interests of the sponsors.”36  One area 
often cited is the development of science regarding the health risks 
of tobacco; in this area, research has documented “a systematic cam-
paign to construct a science around tobacco safety while attempting 
to dismiss as ‘junk science’ findings that connect tobacco use to ex-
cess morbidity and mortality.”37  Similarly, meta-analyses of biomedi-
cal research have shown that research sponsored by drug manufac-
turers is more likely to draw pro-industry conclusions.38 
Moreover, systematic pressures, such as availability of funding, 
may not only affect the way that research is produced, but may also 
lead to a more general exploration of one side of a question—say, the 
benefits of a given product or procedure—than another side.39  A 
vaccine producer might have ample incentives to fund research dem-
onstrating the effectiveness of a certain vaccine, while groups object-
 
 34 Cf. KOMESAR, supra note 11, at 126–27 (discussing how, in the context of litigation, “this 
factual investigation is funded primarily by the parties, not the public”). 
 35 Jillian Clare Cohen-Kohler & Laura C. Esmail, Scientific Misconduct, the Pharmaceutical In-
dustry, and the Tragedy of Institutions, 26 MED. & L. 431, 434–37 (2007) (describing suppres-
sion of data about adverse effects in the Vioxx case). 
 36 Sheldon Krimsky, The Funding Effect in Science and Its Implications for the Judiciary, 13 J.L. & 
POL’Y 43, 59 (2005). 
 37 Id. at 55. 
 38 Id. at 58–59 (discussing a study which “concluded that there was ‘a strong association be-
tween author published positions on the safety of calcium-channel antagonists and their 
financial relationships with pharmaceutical manufacturers’” (quoting Henry T. Stelfox et 
al., Conflict of Interest in the Debate Over Calcium Antagonists, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101 
(1998))). 
 39 See CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS:  SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 216–17 
(2006) (describing how manufacturers of potentially toxic substances have little incentive 
to provide funding for research about the adverse toxicological effects of those sub-
stances); Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act:  Why Better Sci-
ence Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1066 (“Scientists in any given field 
form a loose-knit community, the members of which tend to share certain views.  Those 
views undoubtedly contribute to the choices individual scientists make regarding research 
topics and techniques, both directly, and indirectly, through effects on funding opportu-
nities.”); Krimsky, supra note 36, at 59 (explaining that “commercial affiliation of re-
searchers has a biasing effect”); Stephanie Tai, Three Asymmetries of Informed Environmental 
Decisionmaking, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 659, 661 n.7, 682–84 (2005) (discussing the effects of 
“normative components” of regulatory science on environmental policymaking); see also 
Doremus, supra at 1066 n.193 (describing pressures posed by agency grant funding, peer 
review systems, and legislative targeting of research funds towards specific topics). 
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ing to mandatory vaccination might conduct their own studies calling 
that vaccine’s safety into question.  As a number of scholars have 
documented, the appearance of controversy is often more profound 
where greater normative and economic stakes in a given dispute cre-
ate more incentives for parties to fund scientific research supportive 
of a particular result.40  And areas where scientific research is more 
complex and costly, such as in many areas of environmental regula-
tion,41 will be more sensitive to such systematic pressures than areas 
where research is less resource-intensive. 
Individual researchers, too, may have their own biases that affect 
their research.  These can involve the financial interests described 
earlier, but they can also involve political concerns held by some sci-
entists, from hunger reduction to abortion prevention to climate 
change mitigation.42  These biases are often seen as being “neutral-
ized” by the collective enterprise of science, through peer review and 
norms of skepticism.43  However, individual studies reviewed by courts 
 
 40 See David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Scientific Evidence in the Regulatory System:  Manu-
facturing Uncertainty and the Demise of the Formal Regulatory System, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 17, 17 
(2005) (arguing that “[p]olluters and manufacturers of dangerous products have waged 
sophisticated campaigns to manufacture uncertainty about the scientific evidence used to 
support public health protection and victim compensation”); see also John S. Applegate & 
Robert L. Fischman, Missing Information:  The Scientific Data Gap in Conservation and Chemi-
cal Regulation, 83 IND. L.J. 399 (2008) (introducing a symposium on scientific data gaps in 
risk regulation); Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort:  Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic In-
jury, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1520–22 (2005) (criticizing the tort system as failing to gen-
erate appropriate incentives for non-ends-oriented scientific research into health risks); 
Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance:  The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed 
Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1628–33 (2004) (describing 
how parties likely to be sued under environmental statutes resist producing information 
regarding the risks generated by their activities, even though such parties are those best 
situated to conduct such research); Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for 
Regulatory Science:  Extending the Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private Re-
search, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 122 (2004) (describing how, where stakes are high, spon-
sors of scientific research “face strong incentives to design and report research in ways 
most favorable to their interests and to suppress adverse results provided they can do so 
without detection”). 
 41 See William W. Buzbee, Adjudicatory Triggers of Enhanced Ambient Environmental Information, 
83 IND. L.J. 583, 605 (2008) (“Information about the state of the environment . . . is costly 
to gather and requires great skill to analyze.”). 
 42 See Krimsky, supra note 36, at 52 (“Scientists are not disinterested ideal observers when it 
comes to their own contributions, but rather are people with personal interests outside of 
science.”). 
 43 See JOHN ZIMAN, REAL SCIENCE:  WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT IT MEANS 159 (2000) (“The trick is 
to nullify these individual interests by setting them against one another.  In effect, the sci-
entific ethos delineates an agonistic arena, where a hidden melodrama of clashing egos is 
transformed into apparently dispassionate intellectual debate.  As in a free commercial 
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may still present some of the bias issues described.  While some of 
these concerns may be addressed through rules of disclosure and 
conflict-of-interest prohibitions,44 if this appearance of uncertainty—
or controversy uncertainty, as I will call it—arises not from the sorts 
of variability or epistemological uncertainties discussed earlier, but 
rather from concerted attempts by advocates to develop supportive 
science, then awaiting additional research may not result in its reduc-
tion. 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT AND SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTIES 
The Supreme Court has taken a number of approaches to resolv-
ing legal questions involving the scientific uncertainties discussed ear-
lier.  Although many of these approaches are applied in conjunction 
with, rather than exclusive of, each other, this Article outlines various 
available approaches in order to more methodologically describe the 
Court’s treatment in various cases.45 
The first is a deferential approach, in which the Court could as-
sign a high degree of deference to one institution or another.  There 
are many variations of this model, from deference to a trial court or a 
jury; the legislature; an expert agency; an independent panel of ex-
perts; or even earlier decisions of appellate courts, like the Supreme 
Court itself.  In such an approach, the Court would treat an external 
decision, for example, the decision to require childhood immuniza-
tion from a particular disease, as one deserving of weight.  This deci-
sion, in turn, could be based upon extra-scientific considerations, 
such as the greater evaluative capacity of a given institution, the 
greater scientific (or regulatory) legitimacy of that institution, or even 
greater structural regularity resulting from reliance upon the deci-
sions of that institution. 
 
market, the particular bias of each individual is neutralized in the collective outcome.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 44 See Krimsky, supra note 36, at 61–66 (describing attempts at addressing funding bias 
through conflict-of-interest and disclosure rules, but ultimately arguing that “mere disclo-
sure may . . . prove insufficient to protect the integrity of scientific research,” and that 
judges should understand “the means by which advocacy science surreptitiously enters 
the courtroom and the ways in which this science is distinct from science that is not de-
signed to support a predetermined financial interest”). 
 45 Cf. Jones, supra note 2, at 353–63 (discussing analogous approaches for regulatory agen-
cies to address scientific uncertainty in their decisionmaking processes, including “ac-
knowledgement,” “burden shifting,” “sound science,” “consequences,” “consensus,” “es-
timation,” and “adaptive management”). 
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In other instances, the Court has taken a more substantive ap-
proach by resolving uncertainties in favor of certain substantive con-
cerns.  These concerns could involve a reluctance to remove liberty, 
such as the liberty to refuse an immunization or a reluctance to im-
pose its own regulatory interpretation absent some clear mandate.  
Such decisions might be framed in the context of constitutional or 
even statutory values.46 
Finally, the Court has taken a procedural approach in some in-
stances, requiring an institution to go through a certain degree of de-
liberation and explanation, and upholding that institution’s decision 
if such deliberation is determined to have occurred.  In the vaccine 
example, this could involve requiring a legislature to at least explain 
its reasons and bases for requiring childhood immunization.  As with 
the deferential approach, the process approach might be taken in 
light of capacity or legitimacy concerns, but with the additional gloss 
of transparency (based on, perhaps, constitutional due process or 
statutory requirements) involved. 
As stated earlier, these approaches often overlap.  The Court may 
place weight on the determinations of different institutions, but may 
base the amount of weight upon substantive considerations, such as 
the degree of liberty loss or the appearance of institutional bias.  Or, 
in evaluating the validity of an institution’s decision, the Court may 
factor in the amount of deliberation and explanation provided by 
that institution, but not treat the institution’s statement as determina-
tive of the decision’s validity. 
The Court’s approach varies with regard to the nature of the deci-
sionmaking institution.  Such an institution-varied approach may be 
appropriate, as I shall argue, given the different formally recognized 
and practically available capacities of legislatures, courts, and agen-
cies in evaluating the science before them.  A complete evaluation of 
each institution’s ability to evaluate the science before it, however, 
may ultimately depend on complexities of the science involved in a 
given situation, as well as the presence of interest groups with stakes 
in resolving the question at issue.  Such a full evaluation is beyond 
the scope of this Article; nevertheless, I shall present such factors and 
explain how they could be better incorporated into the deference 
approach of Carhart II.  Moreover, as I shall explain, regardless of the 
ultimate fitness of deferring to a given institution’s choice of actions 
in the face of uncertain science, the Supreme Court’s approach to-
 
 46 Id. at 356–57 (discussing substantive approaches for regulatory agencies to address scien-
tific uncertainty in their decisionmaking processes). 
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wards evaluating the existence of uncertainty in Carhart II leaves a 
number of gaps that could be addressed in future cases. 
A.  Approaches Towards Legislation:  Carhart II 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Carhart II tackles some of these 
questions about resolving scientific uncertainties in the context of ju-
dicial decisionmaking.47  In particular, it attempts to formalize the 
role of legislatures in choosing options in the face of scientific uncer-
tainty—and appears to foreclose some options when the science is 
“certain.”  Carhart II dealt with a facial constitutional challenge to the 
federal Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003, which prohibited a proce-
dure called intact dilation and extraction, or D & X.  Among other 
things, the challengers argued that the Partial Birth Abortion Act was 
an unconstitutional burden on the right to abortion because it lacked 
an exception allowing the prohibited procedure when necessary for 
the mother’s health.48 
This challenge was entirely understandable, because the Court, in 
an earlier case, Stenberg v. Carhart (“Carhart I”),49 had struck down a 
challenge to a similar Nebraska state statute.  That statute had 
banned the D & X procedure entirely, without any explicit exception 
for women’s health, and was not supported by findings about the ne-
cessity—or lack thereof—for such an exception.50  Because of this ab-
sence, the majority held that the “State fail[ed] to demonstrate that 
banning D&X without a health exception may not create significant 
health risks for women, because the record shows that significant 
medical authority supports the proposition that in some circum-
stances, D&X would be the safest procedure.”51 
But although the Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003 contained re-
strictions similar to the Nebraska statute, the level of specificity in the 
congressional findings was quite different.  In enacting the Partial 
Birth Abortion Act, Congress rejected the Court’s findings in Carhart 
I, describing them as “very questionable”52 and stating that it was not 
bound by the Court’s earlier findings.  Instead, Congress stated:  “A 
 
 47 Cf. Hill, supra note 10, at 294–324 (discussing differing constitutional approaches to 
medical cases along autonomy versus public health lines, and distinguishing between a 
number of possible interpretations). 
 48 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1635 (2007). 
 49 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 50 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-328(1) (Supp. 2007). 
 51 Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 932. 
 52 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). 
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moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice of per-
forming a partial-birth abortion . . . is a gruesome and inhumane 
procedure that is never medically necessary and should be prohib-
ited.”53  Moreover, Congress made medical findings that D & X would 
never be necessary to avoid significant health effects for women, ex-
cept when the choice was between using the procedure and death for 
a pregnant woman.54  This was in contrast to the Nebraska statute, 
which failed to contain any such medical findings by the state legisla-
ture.55  As such, the Partial Birth Abortion Act generally prohibited 
the use of D & X, with the exception that the prohibitions would not 
apply where “necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is en-
dangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, 
including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising 
from the pregnancy itself.”56 
Because of this difference between the statutes, the majority 
reached a different conclusion in Carhart II and rejected the facial 
challenge to the Partial Birth Abortion Act.  In rejecting the chal-
lenge, the Court provided some guidance on what Congress can do 
in the face of medical uncertainty.  Although the majority recognized 
“documented medical disagreement [as to] whether the Act’s prohi-
bition would ever impose significant health risks on women,”57 it 
stated:  “Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legis-
lative power in the abortion context any more than it does in other 
contexts.”58  Instead, “[t]he Court has given state and federal legisla-
tures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medi-
cal and scientific uncertainty,”59 with uncertainty, in this context, 
shown by the absence of consensus rather than the scientific uncer-
tainties described earlier. 
In reaching its conclusion, the majority recognized that certain 
congressional findings were contradicted by the evidence before the 
district court.60  Indeed, the majority allowed Congress to act even 
when making some recitations in the Act that the Court stated were 
“factually incorrect.”61  As the majority pointed out, Congress errone-
 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-328(1). 
 56 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a). 
 57 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1636 (2007). 
 58 Id. at 1637. 
 59 Id. at 1636. 
 60 Id. at 1638. 
 61 Id. at 1637–38. 
  
Feb. 2009] UNCERTAINTY ABOUT UNCERTAINTY 687 
 
ously determined that no medical school provided instructions on 
performing D & X.62  Moreover, Congress stated that a medical con-
sensus existed regarding the unnecessary nature of the D & X proce-
dure, when, in fact, none existed.63 
The majority, however, considered the incorrect findings and the 
erroneous existence of uncertainty insufficient to provide grounds to 
hold the Act unconstitutional.  While this view was described as one 
of “[u]ncritical deference,”64 the majority pointed out that it has 
never treated the existence of scientific uncertainty as providing “no 
margin of error.”65  Such a standard would be “too exacting a stan-
dard to impose on the legislative power.”66  Accordingly, the majority 
stated that even where, as here, there was medical “uncertainty over 
whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a wom-
an’s health,”67 the facial challenge must be rejected. 
In applying this approach, the Court drew from a number of ear-
lier cases dealing with legislative actions in the face of scientific and 
medical uncertainty.  Although the majority pointed to these cases as 
support for its general conclusion that the legislature deserves wide 
deference in such areas, the cases themselves involved challenges in 
two somewhat distinct types of legislative contexts involving the use of 
science:  The justificational context, in which legislatures use scien-
tific information (or uncertainty regarding that information) as the 
justification for their choice of actions, and the ontological shaping 
context, in which legislatures create certain legal categories that may 
be based upon, or simply happen to share some overlap with, existing 
scientific or medical categories.  Uncertainty in the justificational 
context can arise when the science that the legislature uses as its justi-
fication is uncertain; uncertainty in the ontological shaping context 
can arise when the scientific or medical categories upon which the 
legislative categories are based lack certainty in their definitions.  The 
differences between these types of cases deserve further explanation 
because, taken as a whole, the Court’s undifferentiated treatment of 
scientific uncertainty in these contexts misses a deeper distinction be-
tween the use of science as justification, and the use of science as an 
ontological tool.  By conflating the use of science as an ontological 
 
 62 Id. at 1638. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
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tool with the use of science as justification, the Court appears to pro-
vide even more deference than is perhaps warranted in the purely 
justificational context. 
1.  Clarity in an Institutional Approach Towards Evaluating and 
Applying Science? 
In affirming Congress’s choice to restrict D & X, the majority in 
Carhart II relied on the principle that deference to legislative choices 
is warranted where a legislature is acting in areas of scientific or 
medical uncertainty.68  But the majority did not purport to apply 
blind deference.  Instead, it characterized the degree to which it de-
fers to legislative choices as not “[u]ncritical.”69 
This level of deference should be highlighted because the ration-
ale provided by the Carhart II majority—that legislatures should have 
room to address risks where science is uncertain—is more related to 
the justificational use of science than the ontological use of science.  
This is because, where a legislature does not purport to justify its ac-
tions by scientific findings, but instead uses them merely to shape a 
particular legal definition, critical review of the science is less relevant 
to evaluating the rationality of the legislature’s actions, given that the 
legislature’s rationale was never premised on its assessment of the 
state of the science. 
Indeed, the Court’s primary reliance on justificational cases is evi-
denced in Carhart II.  In providing “wide discretion” to Congress in 
enacting the Partial Birth Abortion Act, the majority quoted directly 
from one of these cases, Marshall v. United States70:  “When Congress 
undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncer-
tainties, legislative options must be especially broad.”71  In Marshall, 
the Court rejected a plaintiff’s argument that the Narcotic Addict 
Rehabilitation Act of 1966 denied him due process and equal protec-
tion by excluding him from consideration for rehabilitative treatment 
on the ground of his three prior felony convictions.72  According to 
the plaintiff, Congress failed to establish a sufficiently rational nexus 
between proving treatment for drug addiction to reduce criminal re-
cidivism and his status as a multiple offender.73  In rejecting that ar-
 
 68 Id. at 1636. 
 69 Id. at 1638. 
 70 414 U.S. 417 (1974). 
 71 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1636 (quoting Marshall, 414 U.S. at 427). 
 72 Marshall, 414 U.S. at 421–22. 
 73 Id. at 422. 
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gument, the Court pointed to the observation that “there is no gen-
erally accepted medical view as to the efficacy of presently known 
therapeutic methods of treating addicts and the prospect for the suc-
cessful rehabilitation of narcotics addicts thus remains shrouded in 
uncertainty.”74  Indeed, “when courts deal with problems in the ad-
ministration of criminal law such as those related to drug addiction, 
alcoholism, mental disease, and the like, they are necessarily confined 
to the existing limits of human knowledge in those areas.”75  And, as 
even the House and Senate Reports acknowledged with respect to 
that statute, considerable uncertainty remained as to the ability of re-
habilitation efforts to successfully address drug addiction.76  Accord-
ingly, the Court held that it was reasonable for Congress to make this 
sort of policy choice in putting together its experimental program for 
dealing with drug addiction treatment.77 
Likewise, Lambert v. Yellowley,78 also cited by the Carhart II majority, 
addressed a challenge to a statute limiting the amount of alcohol that 
could be contained in any medication prescribed by a physician.  The 
Court observed that Congress recognized: 
[P]racticing physicians differ about the value of malt, vinous and spiritu-
ous liquors for medicinal purposes, but that the preponderating opinion 
is against their use for such purposes; and that among those who pre-
scribe them there are some who are disposed to give prescriptions where 
the real purpose is to divert the liquor to beverage uses.79 
Thus, the Court concluded that: 
Congress, in deference to the belief of a fraction of the medical profes-
sion that vinous and spirituous liquors have some medicinal value, has 
said that they may be prescribed in limited quantities according to stated 
regulations; but it also has said that they shall not be prescribed in larger 
quantities, nor without conforming to the regulations, because this would 
be attended with too much risk of the diversion of the liquor to beverage 
uses.  Not only so, but the limitation as to quantity must be taken as em-
bodying an implicit congressional finding that such liquors have no such 
 
 74 Id. at 426. 
 75 Id. at 426–27. 
 76 See id. at 426 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 89-1486, at 51 (1966); S. REP. NO. 89-1667, at 14 
(1966)). 
 77 Id. at 430. 
 78 272 U.S. 581 (1926). 
 79 Id. at 589–90 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 67-224; Amendment of National Prohibition Act:  Hearing 
on H.R. 5033 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 15–16, 146 (1921) (statements 
of Sen. Thomas Sterling, Sen. Thomas Walsh & Rep. Andrew Volstead), reprined in 61 
Cong. Rec. 3456, 4035–36, 4038, 8749–57). 
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medicinal value as gives rise to a need for larger or more frequent pre-
scriptions.80 
This choice, given the recognized existence of disagreement among 
physicians, was sufficient to uphold the application of the statute to a 
physician who wanted to prescribe alcohol in amounts exceeding that 
allowable under the statute. 
In other cases cited by the Carhart II majority involving justifica-
tional uncertainties, the Court took a similar approach of deference 
towards legislative options.  The Court in those cases, however, pro-
vided less analysis of the medical and scientific uncertainties before 
the legislatures than it did in Marshall or Lambert.  For example, the 
Court in Powell v. Texas81 did not address whether the Texas legisla-
ture had observed any medical uncertainties about whether alcohol 
addiction is a disease; instead, the Court observed on its own that 
“the inescapable fact is that there is no agreement among members 
of the medical profession about what it means to say that ‘alcoholism’ 
is a ‘disease.’”82  Similarly, the Court, in reviewing a challenged com-
pulsory vaccination statute in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,83 did not in-
quire into whether the Massachusetts legislature recognized any un-
certainties about the science, but held that the uncertainties in safety 
raised by the plaintiff did not preclude the legislature from acting to 
address the risk of smallpox.84  Indeed, in Jones v. United States,85 where 
the plaintiff complained that Congress failed to “cite any empirical 
evidence indicating that mentally ill persons who have committed a 
criminal act are likely to commit additional dangerous acts in the fu-
ture,”86 the Court still held that “reasonable legislative judgments” in 
the face of actual medical uncertainties should receive particular def-
erence.87 
The source of the Carhart II majority’s “wide” but not “uncritical” 
discretion is consistent with a view of the legislature as a more appro-
priate institution than courts for weighing complex scientific medical 
information, needed to justify a legislature’s actions, such as those 
about the efficacy of drug addiction treatment for different classes of 
 
 80 Id. at 594–95. 
 81 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
 82 Id. at 522. 
 83 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 84 Id. at 37–38. 
 85 463 U.S. 354 (1983). 
 86 Id. at 364 n.13 (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13, id. (No. 81–5195)). 
 87 Id. at 365 n.13. 
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individuals seen in Marshall.88  Even in those cases where the Court 
did not discuss whether the legislatures themselves recognized the ex-
istence of scientific or medical uncertainties, the Court read into the 
legislative determinations an implicit weighing of the scientific in-
formation before the legislatures and the uncertainties regarding that 
information, given its reference to the “reasonable” judgments of the 
legislatures at issue in those cases. 
The question of whether legislatures are better suited to weigh 
scientific determinations and make decisions in the face of uncer-
tainty is of debate among scholars, however.  Proponents of such a 
deferential approach often point to the greater capacity of Congress 
to gather a broader range of scientific information than that of a 
court.89  Legislatures, after all, receive scientific testimony and input 
from a number of sources, whereas courts often review only the in-
formation provided by the parties90 (and amici91) before them.  
Moreover, proponents argue that legislatures have greater resources 
and more time for gathering facts and weighing them, pointing to-
wards enhanced research services, such as greater numbers of staff 
than judiciary, and the availability of the Congressional Research Ser-
 
 88 See Hill, supra note 10, at 332–41, 333–34 n.293 (discussing debates between proponents 
and critics of deference to legislatures’ factfinding, and citing as a proponent Robin 
Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 
527, 578 (1994)); see also Dan L. Burk, The Milk Free Zone:  Federal and Local Interests in Regu-
lating Recombinant bST, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 227, 280 (1997) (observing that 
“[l]egislatures may consider a wide range of viewpoints, scientific, economic, political, 
and otherwise”); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Proc-
ess, and the Federalism Cases:  An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1740 (2002) 
(“[T]he modern Congress has created information-gathering mechanisms and estab-
lished some procedures that might seem to establish a lawmaking process that approxi-
mates the standards of deliberative due process.”); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Moni-
toring:  The Right Way and the Wrong Way, 70 MO. L. REV. 349, 381 (2005) (“Legislatures are 
better equipped than courts to consider the scientific and medical information necessary 
to set a ‘trigger’ and to change these ‘triggers’ as scientific knowledge progresses.”). 
 89 See Frickey & Smith, supra note 88, at 1740 (“A wide variety of resources, unmatched by 
any other legislature in the world, are at the disposal of members and their commit-
tees.”). 
 90 See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change:  What Role for Federal, 
State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 98–99 (2007) (discussing the lack of 
transparency in common law cases, which involve only parties, intervenors, and court-
sanctioned amici); Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate:  Judicially Administered Statutes 
and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 447 (2008) (stating that because 
courts do not have the time to sort through extra-record material, they are forced to rely 
on “information supplied by the parties and their amici”). 
 91 See generally Stephanie Tai, Friendly Science:  Medical, Scientific, and Technical Amici Before the 
Supreme Court, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 789 (2000) (discussing the participation of scientific or-
ganizations and their members as amici in the judicial process). 
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vice.92  Finally, legislatures may be more accountable to public opin-
ion, or at least the more politically powerful parts of the public, 
thereby allowing them to take these opinions into account in weigh-
ing the scientific information before them.93 
If indeed legislatures have the greater capacity and legitimacy to 
evaluate and apply uncertain science as proponents assert, the defer-
ential approach in situations where legislatures bear the burden of 
supporting their actions against challenge would allow legislatures to 
choose to address risks without waiting for scientific certainty, which 
may never arise.94  Such an approach may be especially welcome in 
addressing environmental and public health risks, where the develop-
ing nature of the science may mean that the risks may not be fully as-
sessed by the scientific and medical communities before the ongoing 
circumstances actually warrant action.95  In such circumstances, under 
the Court’s opinion, a legislature may still find justification to act, de-
 
 92 See Frickey & Smith, supra note 88, at 1739–40 (discussing the duties of the Congressional 
Research Service and the wide variety of resources available to Congress); see also Wendy 
E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181, 200–01 
(“Congress makes good use of positive scientific knowledge . . . [because it] can call upon 
an enviable array of scientific expert advisors to assist in making sense of the unending 
stream of information that arrives in its offices. . . . Several political scientists confirm this 
fact and note also that scientific studies often command great respect in congressional 
deliberations, especially if the source appears neutral and the study findings appear accu-
rate.” (footnotes omitted) (citing BRUCE BIMBER, THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE IN 
CONGRESS:  THE RISE AND FALL OF THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 3 (1996); 
Sanford A. Lakoff, Scientists, Technologists and Political Power, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND 
SOCIETY:  A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 355, 355–57 (Ina Spiegel-Rösing & Derek de 
Solla Price eds., 1977); Dorothy Nelkin, The Political Impact of Technical Expertise, 5 SOC. 
STUD. SCI. 35–54 (1975)). 
 93 See Charlow, supra note 88, at 588 (arguing that “courts defer to legislatures with regard 
to factfinding in part because they consider factfinding properly to be tied up with poli-
cymaking, and thus part of the legislative and not the judicial function”); cf. KOMESAR, su-
pra note 11, at 141 (pointing out how judicial “insulation separates judges from a great 
deal of information about the desires and needs of the public” and that “public officials 
must understand the wants and needs of the general public or at least powerful parts of 
the general public to remain in office or obtain higher office,” but ultimately pointing 
out that under certain circumstances, “these informal channels for presentation or reve-
lation of desires can carry a severely distorted view of public needs”). 
 94 See Adelman, supra note 2, at 937 (2007) (discussing the pervasiveness of scientific uncer-
tainty); see also Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1637–38 (2007) (discussing the extent of medi-
cal uncertainty concerning the necessity of the D & X abortion procedure to preserve 
women’s health). 
 95 Neal F. Lane & Rosina Bierbaum, Recent Advances in the Science of Climate Change, 15 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 147, 147 (2001) (“The timeline of policymaking is also not the same 
as the timeline for science.  Science is an open-ended incremental process with occa-
sional breakthroughs, while policymaking is usually sporadic and often proceeds in large 
steps—such as adopting treaties, reauthorizing environmental laws, or legislating new 
ones.”). 
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spite the existence of some uncertainty.  Moreover, the deferential 
approach may avoid embroiling such attempts to address environ-
mental and public health risks in often lengthy judicial disputes over 
the merits of particular scientific findings, where any or all of the 
sorts of scientific uncertainties described earlier may arise. 
Indeed, a deferential approach avoids some of the problems en-
countered by Professors Philip Frickey and Steven Smith in evaluat-
ing federalism cases where the Supreme Court has required Congress 
to provide more reasoned explanation for their actions.96  As these 
scholars have argued, by requiring Congress to undergo greater 
lengths to present justifications for its actions, the Court is assuming 
that the legislature is undergoing some form of deliberation, “de-
fined as a reasoned discussion in which the outcome is consensus on 
ends and means.”97  Otherwise, an inquiry into the legislature’s justifi-
cation would be less meaningful.  Professors Frickey and Smith chal-
lenge, however, whether legislatures actually undergo such delibera-
tion.98  Instead, given the dynamics of the legislative process, 
“[s]trategic disclosure muddies the legislative record and greatly 
complicates the task of applying a legal standard that asks judges to 
evaluate the quality of that record.”99  Legislative deference in the 
face of scientific and medical uncertainty, in contrast, arguably avoids 
such an inquiry by simplifying the court’s determination into asking 
whether the situation is one in which deference towards the legisla-
ture’s actions is warranted, allowing for nondeliberative processes 
such as strategic disclosure and compromise, rather than an inquiry 
into the substance of the legislative consideration, thereby assuming 
deliberation. 
Carhart II, therefore, can be read as a solidification of the view of 
legislatures as a superior body to courts for assessing scientific infor-
mation and applying it to construct legislative choices in addressing 
medical and health risks.  Whether legislatures in fact deserve such 
deference is not uniformly accepted, however.  Professor Neal Devins 
has pointed out that legislatures may lack incentives to fully inquire 
 
 96 See Frickey & Smith, supra note 88, at 1743 (2002) (“At least for policies in which constitu-
tional values must be weighed with care, the Court seems to suggest that deliberation, not 
simple aggregation, is expected of Congress.”). 
 97 Id. (basing this argument primarily on an examination of the Supreme Court’s federalism 
jurisprudence, where it has demanded “reasons that it finds persuasive, at least when 
Congress’s actions would otherwise infringe on the rights or powers of states”). 
 98 Id. at 1743–45. 
 99 Id. at 1744. 
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into all the relevant scientific and medical bases for their decisions.100  
Especially when legislators are aware that their factual determinations 
would be reviewed by courts, they may face disincentives to avoid ad-
dressing scientific findings that undermine their political choices. 
Such disincentives may be heightened in situations where the 
skewed distribution of potential stakeholders “is manifested in either 
extreme minoritarian or majoritarian bias.”101  As Professor Neil Ko-
mesar has pointed out, stakeholders with fewer resources may be less 
able to recognize their stakes in a given problem.102  Without such 
recognition, these potential stakeholders may not provide incentives 
for legislators to respond to their interests—even interests in obtain-
ing more information.103  Stakeholders with more resources, in con-
trast, will be more able to both recognize their stakes in an issue and 
lobby legislators more effectively.104  In such situations, the factual de-
terminations may not be representative of the “science as a whole,” 
but rather those supportive of a skewed view, depending on the 
group that has more political force in that circumstance. 
Legislative disincentives to consider a full range of available sci-
ence may also be heightened in situations where the science is par-
ticularly complex.  Professor Wendy Wagner has observed that gaps 
in scientific understanding among the public may lead it to be igno-
rant of both the nature of certain environmental problems, as well as 
the limits of science in evaluating and treating those problems.105  
Such failures may provide incentives for legislatures to fall back on 
asserted “scientific determinations” or even asserted “scientific uncer-
tainties” to provide a neutral cover for decisions that are, at their 
base, policy decisions.106  As such, both the complexity of the scientific 
information as well as the distribution of interests with political stakes 
 
100 Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review:  A Preliminary Analysis, 
50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1178 (2001). 
101 KOMESAR, supra note 11, at 148. 
102 Id. at 71 (“The more complex the social issue the more difficult or expensive it is to rec-
ognize one’s position.”). 
103 Cf. Tai, supra note 39, at 688–92 (describing how the lay public is less able to engage in 
scientific dialogue with agencies than regulated entities and organized regulatory benefi-
ciaries). 
104 See id. at 688–89 (arguing that “[w]ell-funded and organized entities . . . can more easily 
afford to generate” technical studies than the “lay public”). 
105 See Wagner, supra note 92, at 225–27 (“[T]he public has a limited understanding of the 
scientific enterprise . . . .”); see also Wagner, supra note 29, at 1653–54 (“Due to their in-
adequate scientific training, the public and the media are unlikely to recognize institu-
tional policy choices embedded in hypertechnical scientific justifications.”). 
106 Wagner, supra note 92, at 225–27; see also Wagner, supra note 29, at 1653–54. 
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may significantly affect whether courts or legislatures are more capa-
ble of making choices in the face of scientific uncertainty.107 
Furthermore, Professor Douglas Laycock argues that the structure 
of legislative hearings may limit Congress’s ability to receive a thor-
ough discussion of the available medical and scientific research.108  Al-
though courts often treat legislatures as having more time to deliber-
ate than courts, the large number of issues faced by legislatures 
means that their time on one particular issue may ultimately be lim-
ited.109  Indeed, the party in the political minority often faces even 
more constraints, in terms of both the number of witnesses it can call 
for hearings, as well as the time allotted for that witness testimony.110  
This is in contrast to courts, where the rules of civil litigation allow 
each party in a given case more equal opportunity to present its own 
evidence and witnesses.111 
Finally, Professor B. Jessie Hill argues that legislatures may be just 
as deficient as courts in scientific competency necessary to under-
stand the research before them.112  Legislators themselves are often 
lay decisionmakers, not trained in fully evaluating scientific discourse 
or the limits of scientific discourse.113  And although legislators may 
have access to research services such as the Congressional Research 
Service, the General Accounting Office, and the National Academies, 
the availability of such access does not mean that legislatures actually 
use those resources in most circumstances.114 
 
107 Neil Komesar identifies a number of other factors in determining how influential concen-
trated minorities may be, including: 
the complexity of the issue involved, the absolute level of the average per capita 
stakes of the larger group, the unevenness of the distribution of the larger group 
and the chance that this heterogeneity will produce catalytic subgroups, and the 
availability of free or low cost information to the larger group. 
  KOMESAR, supra note 11, at 73. 
108 See Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1174–75 (2007) (arguing 
that legislative hearings are not nearly as effective and comprehensive as some think they 
are). 
109 See id. at 1175 (stating that legislators “are spread far too thin”). 
110 See id. (“The party in the minority often gets fewer than half the witnesses and only one 
week’s notice of the hearing.”). 
111 Id. at 1176. 
112 See Hill, supra note 10, at 337–38 (“There is . . . little reason to believe that legislatures 
possess—or exercise—superior institutional competency in the context of medical and 
scientific fact.”); see also id. at 335–41 (providing a full discussion of such critiques). 
113 See Wagner, supra note 92, at 193–96 (describing failures of Congress to fully recognize 
data gaps in scientific information with respect to constructing environmental statutes). 
114 See Hill, supra note 10, at 337 n.312 (pointing out that the Congressional Research Service 
and General Accounting Office does not conduct their own medical or scientific studies); 
id. at 338 n.313 (describing the National Academies as “arguably the equivalent of some 
of Congress’s other fact-gathering arms,” but stating that “it is unclear how often Con-
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These problems are complicated by what Professor Komesar ob-
serves as the implications of judicial scale.  As either legislation or the 
public enforcement of legislation grows, so does the “role of courts as 
implementers of legislation.”115  But because the judiciary, especially 
the appellate judiciary, is rather limited in size by a number of struc-
tural constraints,116 courts may respond by creating litigation disin-
centives and using gatekeeping mechanisms, from decreasing 
chances of plaintiff success to imposing decisionmaking rules that al-
low them to “resolve more disputes at lower cost.”117  What this could 
mean is that any expansion and greater use of legislative capacity for 
evaluating and processing scientific uncertainties in constructing leg-
islative choices could have resonating effects.  If legislatures were to 
expand and make greater use of this capacity, as some advocate, or if 
courts were to scrutinize the substance of legislative determinations, 
as others advocate,118 litigation could increase because of these 
greater avenues for challenges.  In turn, in response to this greater 
demand on their resources, courts might adopt differing modes of 
review to limit such challenges. 
Despite well-founded critiques and complexities, the deferential 
approach may still be welcome among those engaging in scientific re-
search.  The dangers of the Court making its own determinations on 
scientific and medical issues is that such determinations will fix into 
place “science” that could be ultimately undermined by additional 
studies.  Such a “fixing” may be of concern to the scientific commu-
nity for two reasons.  First, such an approach would conflict with the 
nature of science as continuously in development.119  While additional 
 
gress, not to mention state legislatures, relies on studies conducted by the National Acad-
emies”). 
115 KOMESAR, supra note 11, at 142. 
116 Id. at 144–45. 
117 Id. at 147.  Professor Komesar points out these factors not to address specifically the fit-
ness of deferring to the legislative weighing of scientific uncertainties, but rather to chal-
lenge the notion that courts can determine whether or not to resolve an issue simply by 
assessing their own capacities.  Instead, he argues: 
Courts must consider their own abilities and the impacts on their resources, but 
they must consider more.  In the relevant comparative institutional world, courts 
may be called upon to consider issues for which they are ill equipped in some ab-
solute sense because they are better equipped to do so in a relative sense. 
  Id. at 149.  Such observed dynamics, however, are relevant to arguments regarding legisla-
tive capacities as well, because of the interrelated functions of these institutions. 
118 See generally Hill, supra note 10 (proposing a greater role for review of scientific uncertain-
ties by courts, but acknowledging the critiques of such an approach). 
119 See Christopher Onstott, Judicial Notice and the Law’s “Scientific” Search for Truth, 40 AKRON 
L. REV. 465, 477 (2007) (describing the application of the Frye evidentiary standards to 
judicial notice as inconsistent with the ever-evolving nature of science); see also THOMAS S. 
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research on a given issue may both refine and change the state of the 
science on a given issue before a court, judicial decisions—including 
that on scientific matters—are often treated as permanent, especially 
by other courts, given the doctrine of stare decisis.120  Permanent de-
termination of the state of science, however, may create challenges 
for the legitimacy of courts, especially when later scientific develop-
ments call those earlier determinations into question.121  This danger 
is not as great for legislative determinations of science, given that leg-
islatures are freer to revisit their determinations. 
Indeed, Professor Todd Aagaard and Judge Robert E. Keeton 
have observed that judicial determinations about the science involved 
in facial challenges to a statute may operate as legislative factfinding 
that becomes embedded in precedent, more so than the deferential 
review of factfinding by legislatures.122  This is because such determi-
 
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 79, 92–94 (3d ed. 1996) (describing 
how the development of science is characterized by “scientific revolutions” that aim to re-
solve paradigmatic “crises”); KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS:  THE 
GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 215–17 (1963); Robert J. Condlin, “What’s Really Go-
ing On?”  A Study of Lawyer and Scientist Inter-Disciplinary Discourse, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER 
& TECH. L.J. 181, 229–30 (1999) (describing views about the consistent presence of un-
certainty in science put forth by scientists at a panel discussion); Deborah M. Hussey Free-
land, Maieusis Through a Gated Membrane:  “Getting The Science Right” in Public Decisionmak-
ing, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 373, 384 (2007) (explaining that “scientific inquiry generates 
facts that are expected to be provisional, having an understood and acknowledged poten-
tial for revision as other facts are developed”); Allan Sobel, Foreword:  The Intersection of 
Law and Science Symposium, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 591, 591 (2006) (“The law strives for truth, 
justice, and finality, one case at a time, in its own insular way.  Science searches for abso-
lute truth by constantly raising questions and testing hypotheses in hopes of finding an-
swers.  Science does not recognize finality.  Our citizens look to science and law as path-
ways to truth.”). 
120 See Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, Solomon Meets Galileo (and Isn’t Quite Sure What to Do with 
Him), 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2237, 2254 (1994) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 598 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(offering a similar critique)); Onstott, supra note 119, at 475 (“Most courts recognize that 
a previously judicially noticed scientific principle carries precedential value.”). 
121 Cf. Onstott, supra note 119, at 486 (“Thus, judges, whose competency in dealing with sci-
entific and technical evidence is already widely questioned, may suffer a net trust loss, 
even if they manage to get the scientific or technical question right more often than 
wrong in issuing judicial notice.” (footnote omitted)).  This is not to say that courts have 
not made determinations that later have been found erroneous.  As Professor Onstott has 
pointed out, courts have made determinations—later shown to be erroneous—that sew-
age can always be rendered innocuous, that tobacco presents few injurious effects, and 
that X-ray machines present little or no danger in their use.  See id. at 465–69.  Rather, my 
argument, similar to that of Professor Onstott, is simply that courts should take this “ten-
sion” into account before making scientific determinations. 
122 See Todd S. Aargaard, Factual Premises of Statutory Interpretation in Agency Review Cases, 77 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 19) (“[A] premise fact becomes 
embedded in the principle of law it supports and therefore becomes, either explicitly or 
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nations would involve “facts that explicitly or implicitly serve as prem-
ises used to decide issues of law,” or what Judge Keeton deems “prem-
ise facts.”123  In particular, Professor Aargaard points out: 
[W]hereas a determination of an adjudicative fact is binding only to the 
extent of rules of preclusion—law of the case, res judicata, or collateral 
estoppel—a premise fact becomes embedded in the principle of law it 
supports and therefore becomes, either explicitly or implicitly, binding 
precedent.  A court in a subsequent case cannot disregard binding 
precedent announcing a legal principle merely on the ground that the 
principle is based on an erroneous factual premise.124 
Thus, in facial challenges such as the ones addressed in this Article, 
judicial inquiries into the substantive scientific support for a legisla-
tive determination present the danger that future courts might be re-
quired to apply earlier scientific determinations that have ultimately 
been undermined. 
Indeed, the current application of the super-stare decisis doc-
trine125 to precedents regarding statutory challenges should provide 
additional reasons for the Court to be wary of reaching scientific de-
terminations where the science is uncertain, rather than deferring to 
the legislature.  Under this doctrine, 
Statutory precedents . . . often enjoy a super-strong presumption of cor-
rectness.  In some cases, the Court says it will overrule statutory prece-
dents only under the most compelling circumstances, such as new consti-
tutional developments.  According to many judges and commentators, 
this heightened adherence to stare decisis “marks an essential difference 
between statutory interpretation on the one hand and [common] law 
and constitutional interpretation on the other.”126 
 
implicitly, binding precedent.”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126730; Robert E. 
Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things:  Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 
1, 26, 28 (1988) (“Legislative-fact determinations by a legislature as a basis for enacting a 
statute and precedential-fact determinations by a court as a basis for deciding an issue of 
law are a part of the body of decisions that have a force at least analogous to, if not the 
same as, the force of law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
123 Keeton, supra note 122, at 8 (emphasis omitted). 
124 Aargaard, supra note 122, at 19 (footnote omitted). 
125 Lemos, supra note 90, at 454 (“The doctrine of stare decisis makes judicial lawmaking 
more rigid still.  Courts purport to apply a ‘super-strong’ version of stare decisis to their 
interpretations of statutes.” (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 
76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988))).  But see Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super-Precedent, 14 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 410–11 (2007) (criticizing a bifurcated conception of stare de-
cisis versus super-stare decisis as failing to recognize the broad range of precedential ap-
proaches). 
126 Eskridge, supra note 125, at 1362–63 (alteration in original) (quoting Edward H. Levi, An 
Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 540 (1948)).  As Professor William 
Eskridge has observed, “in a significant number of cases the Court has refused seriously to 
consider overruling or narrowing statutory precedents that might have been vulnerable 
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Although Professor Eskridge points to exceptions and inconsistencies 
in the application of this presumption to ultimately argue that the 
Court should depart from this “rhetoric” of super-strong prece-
dents,127 judicial decisions regarding scientific issues in the context of 
statutory challenges may still fall under this umbrella of “super-
precedent,” and thus arguably remain crystallized in the case law.128 
Second, a judicial determination regarding science may provide 
disincentives for scientists to engage in the sort of self-critical re-
search that many recognize to be a laudable aspect of scientific de-
velopment.129  A number of scholars have already observed that 
heightened legal stakes have led to an adversarial development of sci-
entific research.130  Such critiques apply to legislative determinations131 
as well as judicial determinations.132  I do not, therefore, argue that 
deference to legislative determinations would remove all adversarial 
incentives for scientific research.  The often interest group-driven na-
ture of the political system means that, to some extent, interest-driven 
forces will shape the development of scientific research.133  This is es-
 
had they been common law or constitutional precedents.”  Eskridge, supra note 125, at 
1368. 
127 Id. at 1425–26. 
128 See Levi, supra note 126, at 523–40 (discussing cases exhibiting this trend). 
129 See David S. Caudill, Ethnography and the Idealized Accounts of Science in Law, 39 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 269, 276 (2002) (describing self-criticism as a factor that may be “conceived as 
conducive to natural scientific inquiry”); David L. Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution:  
Reflections and Ruminations of the Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 661, 673 (2000) (“The key to being a good scientist is, of course, to be self-
critical.”). 
   Thomas Kuhn takes a more nuanced view regarding self-criticism, pointing out that, 
examined as a whole, scientific research is not continuously self-critical.  Rather, accord-
ing to Kuhn, scientific development can be seen as progressing through different phases:  
“scientific revolutions,” in which large paradigmatic shifts are made.  See KUHN, supra note 
16, at 226–27, and “normal science,” which develops in a manner committed (and there-
fore arguably un-self-critical), to a particular paradigm, see id. at 232–37. 
130 See discussion supra note 40. 
131 See Nicholas A. Robinson, The ‘Ascent Of Man’:  Legal Systems and the Discovery of an Envi-
ronmental Ethic, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 497, 503 (1998) (“Where science is dynamic and 
displaces old hypothesis [sic] for new and more refined understandings, and where phi-
losophy admits of self-criticism and seeks refinement, our legislation tends merely to ac-
cumulate.”). 
132 See discussion supra note 40; see also William C. Thompson, Accepting Lower Standards:  The 
National Research Council’s Second Report on Forensic DNA Evidence, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 405, 
408 (1997) (arguing that the “the desire to be effective in the courtroom causes forensic 
scientists to stifle some of the open, self-critical discussion of issues that helps root out 
problems and correct errors in academic science”). 
133 KOMESAR, supra note 11, at 148. 
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pecially the case when the provision of funds greatly affects the na-
ture of the research that can be undertaken.134 
But courts, at least in theory, are less free than legislatures to re-
visit their determinations,135 especially when courts adhere to stare 
decisis generally, and even purport to adhere to a doctrine of super-
stare decisis regarding statutory interpretations.  This increased per-
manency would raise the stakes involved in scientific research such 
that funding institutions that either have financial stakes or hold par-
ticular normative views may become even more reluctant to provide 
resources for research that raises even the possibility of undermining 
their interests.  Indeed, such funding institutions may hold even 
greater power to affect the development of science where research 
funds are tied to nondisclosure agreements, in which sponsors of re-
search have contractual rights regarding the publication of research 
results.136  Individual scientists, too, could be affected by any heighten-
ing of legal stakes; an individual scientist who holds a particular nor-
mative view as a citizen, as many do, may be less willing to engage in 
self-critical research where the results of such research present a 
greater danger of being used to support a permanent decision with 
which that individual disagrees.137 
An approach of deferring to legislative decisions in areas where 
the scientific or medical bases of such decisions are uncertain allows 
scientists to conduct further independent research, including self-
critical research, into areas in which they or their sponsors may have 
normative considerations without at least the fear that additional 
findings would create permanent legal problems for legislative ef-
forts, research that may be useful for the future refinement of legisla-
 
134 See generally Krimsky, supra note 36 (discussing how academic funding structure and fi-
nancial conflicts of interest influence the results of scientific research). 
135 See Devins, supra note 100, at 1180 (pointing out that “Congress is not constrained by 
stare decisis. . . . [because it] can correct its mistakes in ways that the Court cannot”).  But 
see id. at 1184–85 (recognizing that legislative inertia may mean that legislatures do not 
revisit issues as often as theoretically possible). 
136 See Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical 
Research:  A Systematic Review, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 454, 463 (2003) (describing research-
ers’ feelings of inability to fully negotiate with their sponsors regarding publication rights 
and confidentiality); Jacqueline Fox, Reinvigorating the Concept of Benefit:  The Failure of 
Drug Company-Sponsored Research on Human Subjects, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 605, 635–36 
(2008) (describing the degree to which at least pharmaceutical sponsors exert control 
over their funded researchers); see also Krimsky, supra note 36, at 48–49 (describing one 
such example involving a pharmacologist at University of California San Francisco re-
searching the effectiveness of various pharmaceutical drugs in treating hyperthyroidism). 
137 Cf. Krimsky, supra note 36, at 52 (explaining that “the self-correcting function of sci-
ence . . . serves as a balancing force” against the individual biases of scientists). 
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tive and administrative efforts in these areas.  By expressly deferring 
to policy choices made through legislative investigation, the Court, in 
recognition of its own lesser capacity to assess the scientific informa-
tion available and determine its weight as justification for a given pol-
icy, provides assurance that contrary information developed through 
such a process would not undermine whatever legislative option is 
eventually chosen,138 leaving the door open for further research in the 
area to continue to shape legislative options.139 
This is not to argue that scientific and medical issues are entirely 
unsuitable for judicial evaluation.  As a number of scholars have 
pointed out, legislatures may be weaker at fully evaluating scientific 
uncertainties than often assumed.140  And entirely foregoing such de-
terminations may mean that “serious social problems involving dis-
persed interests are excluded from the judicial process even though 
these problems are handled very badly elsewhere.”141  Thus, a court’s 
inquiry into whether a legislative decision deserves deference could 
be aided by at least some consideration of whether dispersed interests 
have been excluded from the judicial process, and, indeed, whether 
such exclusion has led to the sorts of biases discussed earlier in terms 
of the scientific information that has been brought before the legisla-
ture, or even been developed.142 
The nature of the scientific uncertainties involved with a given 
legislative problem, described earlier in this Article,143 could also play 
a role in determining whether a legislative decision deserves defer-
ence.  Not every situation will present equal dangers that judicial de-
cisions regarding science will be undermined by subsequent devel-
opments in scientific research.  Parameter uncertainties may be more 
amenable to characterization through an examination of the existing 
state of measurement methods and technologies.  Model uncertainty, 
however, may involve deeper uncertainties regarding the scientific 
understandings of the processes themselves, and thus be more sus-
ceptible to being reconsidered in future scientific research.  And va-
 
138 See Devins, supra note 100, at 1180 (“Congress’s legitimacy is not at all tied to whether it 
stands above the hurly burly of politics by adhering to precedent.”). 
139 See Rebecca S. Dresser et al., Breast Implants Revisited:  Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 WIS. 
L. REV. 705, 772 (“While litigation is not a good way to produce good science, scientific 
studies are sometimes conducted, as in the DNA cases, in response to litigation, and the 
breast implant controversy appears to be no exception.” (footnote omitted)). 
140 See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
141 KOMESAR, supra note 11, at 148. 
142 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
143 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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riability uncertainties and decision uncertainties may never be fully 
resolved by developing science because they involve either inherent 
variabilities in the system being studied or normative choices that 
must be made in the course of research.144  Courts should pay atten-
tion, therefore, to advances in decisionmaking in the context of sci-
entific uncertainties to better assess judicial capacities to evaluate sci-
ence in a given situation of uncertainty, as well as the likelihood that 
a judicial decision will be undermined by developing research. 
The Court could avoid, for example, creating potentially obsolete 
scientific precedent by observing, in its decision, that its holding 
merely reflects its understanding of the existing state of the science, 
thereby preventing future courts from being forced to treat such de-
terminations as precedential in those future cases, should the weight 
of developing scientific information undermine the earlier determi-
nation.145  Such suggestions for reforming the substantive judicial 
treatment of science are beyond the scope of this paper, as the rele-
vant capacities of courts and legislatures in assessing the science may 
differ, depending on the complexity of the science and the distribu-
tion and stakes of the interests involved.146  Instead, my more limited 
suggestion is that the presence of such concerns may mean that those 
who are proponents of a less adversarial development of science may 
welcome a deferential approach towards legislative decisions where 
the medical or scientific bases for those decisions are uncertain. 
2.  Obscurity on Institutional Approach Towards Evaluating and 
Applying Scientific Uncertainties 
The debate over whether courts or legislatures are better suited to 
make choices in the face of scientific and medical uncertainty ob-
scures a deeper problem with the Supreme Court’s approach in 
Carhart II:  how to determine whether scientific uncertainties rise to a 
level warranting deference to legislative choices.  The question of 
 
144 A disclosure:  I am currently a member of a National Academies Institute of Medicine 
panel advising the Environmental Protection Agency on environmental decision-making 
under uncertainty.  Because the final report has not been issued, I am not at liberty to 
write about our deliberations.  Moreover, the positions taken in this Article do not repre-
sent the view of the panel or of the Institute of Medicine. 
145 See Onstott, supra note 119, at 485 (“A judge deeming a scientific principle to be reliable 
and relevant that later proves not to be will be less damning than a judge conclusively ac-
cepting a principle as unquestionable when that principle later becomes questionable or 
even manifestly unreliable.”). 
146 See KOMESAR, supra note 11, at 148 (noting the problems that may arise from prohibiting 
the judiciary to be make decisions in certain areas). 
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which institution is more appropriate for determining whether scien-
tific uncertainties should allow or even require legislative action is 
not fully resolved by the Court.  Instead, the Court introduced more 
mud into the waters.  On one hand, the Court upheld the congres-
sional decision to prohibit the use of D & X without engaging in its 
own inquiry into the validity of Congress’s justification for finding 
that D & X is never medically necessary,147 suggesting that it possessed 
less capacity than Congress to do so.  On the other hand, the Court 
did not hold back from determining that Congress erred in finding 
that a scientific consensus existed as to the necessity of the D & X 
method,148 suggesting that the Court believed it had adequate capac-
ity to make a determination regarding whether such consensus ex-
isted.  Such contradiction is not present in the cases upon which the 
Court relied, given that the legislatures in those instances had not 
spoken to the certainty of the scientific and medical bases for their 
actions; instead, they had either discussed the uncertainty of the sci-
entific and medical bases, or failed to address the status of the science 
entirely.  The Court’s failure to provide guidance either on how to 
determine or what institution should get to determine whether scien-
tific uncertainties exist, such that legislative deference is warranted, 
creates three major concerns:  that the accountability of public deci-
sionmaking will be eroded; that courts will be able to reach ends-
oriented decisions under the guise of determining whether uncer-
tainty exists; and that the open progress of scientific research will be 
compromised. 
First, from the standpoint of open political debate, this ambiguity 
over the comparative capacities of judicial and legislative institutions 
to assess the existence of uncertainty is troublesome.  It allows a legis-
lature to frame its decision as somehow based upon science, rather 
than as a political choice taken in the face of scientific uncertainty—
the purported rationale for providing deference in the first place—
and still receive deference for taking action in the face of such uncer-
tainty. 
As Professor Wendy Wagner observed in her very thorough study 
of the “science charade” in toxic risk regulation, overreliance on sci-
entific rationales can be detrimental to accountable public decision-
making.149  Although the focus of her study was on overreliance on 
 
147 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1637 (2007). 
148 Id. at 1635–36. 
149 See Wagner, supra note 29, at 1673–88 (1995) (arguing that overreliance on scientific ra-
tionales by agencies in setting standards, in order to avoid accountability for the underly-
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scientific rationales by federal agencies, a number of her observations 
are instructive even in the context of legislative decisionmaking.  In 
particular, she points to concerns such as the creation of barriers to 
democratic participation,150 as well as adverse impacts on scientific 
development and legitimacy.151  When science is invoked as the driver 
for government decisions, members of the public are less able to take 
part in the dialogue needed to reveal their values.152  Nevertheless, 
such input on values may be necessary to provide context for a legis-
lative choice, especially where the science is incomplete or uncertain, 
because in such instances values must be used to either fill in uncer-
tainties in the data, measurements, or models, or even to better clar-
ify value uncertainties.153  And, somewhat ironically perhaps, overreli-
ance on purported “certainties” in science may erode the legitimacy 
of science by providing incentives for a legislature to frame its debate 
as one of “purely” scientific disagreement, rather than a disagree-
ment over values.  Proponents and opponents of a given action will 
thus have more incentives to both provide and fund adversarial sci-
ence, leading to the perception that science is always contradictory 
and cannot aid in resolving these difficult social issues.154 
Similarly, by claiming that “certain” science dictates a particular 
legislative action, legislatures are able to avoid the difficult but inher-
ent policy debates involved in legislative choices.  As the Supreme 
Court observed in Carhart II, medical certainty that the D & X proce-
dure was never necessary for the health of pregnant women did not 
exist.155  Yet, Congress was able to frame a large part of its debate over 
the legislation as a “neutral” one regarding the nature of the scien-
tific evaluation of the concern, rather than acknowledging that it was 
 
ing policies, can result in distancing the public from major decisions affecting public 
health and economic well-being). 
150 See id. at 1674–77. 
151 See id. at 1685–88. 
152 See Wagner, supra note 92, at 228 (“Research reveals that people are more inclined to par-
ticipate in decisionmaking when they are both interested in the issue and feel that they 
can contribute meaningfully to the decision.  If the questions ripe for public debate are 
perceived to be scientific or technical in nature, laypersons may not know how or where 
policy input is needed.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Wagner, supra note 29, at 1674 (“Mis-
characterization of the entire standard-setting endeavor as resolvable by science results in 
significant obstacles to democratic participation.”). 
153 See Wagner, supra note 29, at 1674 (“Although some have questioned the benefit or cost-
effectiveness of any public involvement in science-policy issues, most commentators con-
clude that the wide range of public values implicated in these complex problems can and 
must be ascertained only with the general public’s assistance.” (footnote omitted)). 
154 See id. at 1688. 
155 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1636 (2007). 
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making a political choice of restricting the D & X procedure given 
the medical uncertainties of its necessity.156  Allowing the legislative 
discourse to focus on the realm of science157 may have the effect of ei-
ther misleading the public about the uncertainties involved with the 
medical information before the legislature, or undermining confi-
dence in the science, as members of the lay public who disagree with 
the legislative action become skeptical of its purported scientific ba-
sis.  Ultimately, the danger of providing deference to a legislative de-
cision purported to be based on scientific “certainty” but judicially 
determined to be warranted because of scientific uncertainty is one 
of transparency:  If a legislative decision is shaped by normative ra-
tionales, then the public should be made aware of them, rather than 
having those rationales obscured by invocations of scientific certainty. 
Second, the prevalence of uncertainty with regard to most scien-
tific questions suggests that the Court may retain a significant amount 
of unstated leeway in determining whether to uphold or overturn a 
statute, subsumed under a less visible but more unconstrained in-
quiry into whether scientific uncertainty exists such that deference to 
the legislature is warranted.158  This is because, under the Court’s 
opinion, the determination of whether uncertainty exists is critical in 
deciding whether to uphold a statute if a challenger argues that the 
basis of the legislative decision is undermined by contrary science.  
The broad latitude that the Court has given to the legislature in 
choosing options when scientific and medical uncertainties exist sug-
gests that a legislature’s options would be curtailed were the science 
both certain and pointing towards a conclusion other than that relied 
upon by the legislature.  Thus, under Carhart II, a challenge to a stat-
ute in which a legislature purports to deal with public health and en-
vironmental risks will require a court to engage in the determination 
 
156 18 U.S.C. § 1531 notes (2006). 
157 As Professor Wagner points out, public choice theory suggests that legislators have incen-
tives to describe their decisions as based upon science:  “Rather than debating competing 
values, lawmakers can defer (in theory) to the objective research of scientists to resolve 
thorny environmental controversies.”  Wagner, supra note 92, at 234–35. 
158 Cf. Andrew Green, Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO:  How Constraining Are 
Trade Rules?, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 143, 167 (2005) (criticizing a similar sort of unstated ju-
dicial discretion in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade context, stating that 
“[t]he significance of scientific uncertainty or degree of deference to domestic regulators 
will . . . be left to a largely non-transparent exercise of discretion by the individual 
Panel”); id. at 187–88 (noting that the World Trade Organization rules impose scientific 
evidence requirements in certain areas that allow the Appellate Body to grant little defer-
ence to nations’ decisions); Walker, supra note 2, at 228 (describing how tribunal deci-
sions inherently involve determinations about the degree of uncertainty that is norma-
tively acceptable). 
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of whether the science is certain or uncertain.  But uncertainty is per-
vasive to science, to some extent, especially in areas involving health 
and environmental risks.159  Failure to articulate a principled method 
for determining whether scientific and medical uncertainties warrant 
legislative discretion, therefore, would allow a court with a normative 
bias to either “find” certainty when it wants to uphold a legislative ac-
tion, or “find” certain science supportive of a contrary decision when 
it wants to overturn that action.160 
Such potential effects of judicial bias have already been observed 
in the context of courts’ application of the inquiry under Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.161 for determining 
whether a federal agency interpretation of a congressional directive 
warrants deference.162  The Chevron test, outlined by the Supreme 
Court, is divided into two steps:  first, an inquiry into whether the “in-
tent of Congress is clear”;163 and if not, whether the agency interpreta-
tion is based upon a “permissible construction of the statute.”164  
Thus, the Chevron approach presents some similarities to the scientific 
uncertainty approach in Carhart II, where a court must first deter-
mine whether the science is certain, and, if not, deference towards 
the legislative choice is warranted (unless that decision were found to 
be irrational).165 
Scholars have observed, however, that this seemingly principled 
test still allows for some degree of political decisionmaking to be sub-
sumed under the two-part test.  As various scholars have found 
through extensive empirical studies, judicial ideology appears to have 
an impact on courts’ decisions to defer to agency interpretations un-
der Chevron.166  Nor is the application of the Chevron test consistently 
 
159 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
160 Cf. Wagner, supra note 92, at 284–85 (describing concerns with “courts’ demonstrated 
political biases in applying what should be objective procedural rules in reviewing agency 
rulemakings,” concerns that could also be applied to biases in determining the existence 
of uncertainty warranting legislative deference). 
161 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
162 Id. at 842–43 (describing the two-step inquiry into determining whether an agency inter-
pretation of a statutory mandate warrants judicial deference). 
163 Id. at 842. 
164 Id. at 843. 
165 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1636–38 (2007). 
166 See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory 
Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 770 
(2008) (finding that judicial ideologies, as keyed to presidential appointments, seem to 
have an effect on Chevron decisions in the environmental context); Thomas J. Miles & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?  An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 
U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825–26 (2006) (finding that as a general matter, decisions in Chevron 
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applied; as scholars suggest, the Supreme Court often fails to even 
reference the inquiry in situations when the issue involved in the case 
would seem to present a Chevron determination of whether to defer 
to an agency interpretation of a statute.167 
Judicial bias may have an even greater effect in the context of leg-
islative deference based on a finding of scientific uncertainty than in 
the context of Chevron.  While long-developed principles of statutory 
interpretation are available to courts for evaluating whether legisla-
tive clarity exists such that deference to agency interpretations is cur-
tailed,168 these tools are less available in the context of evaluating sci-
entific uncertainty.  Moreover, while judges are trained in tools of 
text and language such as rhetoric and metaphor,169 they are often 
less trained in evaluating science, much less its limits and uncertain-
 
cases correlate with judicial ideologies).  But see Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron:  
An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE. J. ON REG. 1, 
48–52, 59–60 (1998) (finding much support for the political model of judicial decision-
making under Chevron, but little evidence that the likelihood that political factors shape 
deference to agency decisions “is greater than that fostered under the doctrinal regime 
that Chevron replaced”). 
167 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1089–90 (2008) (finding that in only 8.3% of cases evaluating agency statutory interpreta-
tions before the Supreme Court from the time Chevron came down through the 2005 
term did the Court apply the Chevron analysis); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Ex-
ecutive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 970, 980 (1992) (stating that “the Chevron framework is 
used in only about half the cases that the Court perceives as presenting a deference ques-
tion” and “has not produced anything like a complete revolution in the Court’s jurispru-
dence”). 
168 See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) (“If a 
court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had 
an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given 
effect.”).  Whether such tools of statutory interpretation necessarily provide more princi-
pled results, however, is a matter of debate.  As Professor Czarnezki points out, “depend-
ing on what a judge considers to be legitimate ‘traditional tools of statutory interpreta-
tion,’ he or she may reach a different conclusion under Chevron.”  Czarnezki, supra note 
165, at 773–74 (footnote omitted). 
169 See Francis J. Mootz III, Vico’s “Ingenious Method” and Legal Education, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1261, 1293 (2008) (“When lawyers argue and judges reason about matters that require 
deliberation rather than demonstration, the result of these activities is properly termed 
‘rhetorical knowledge.’  The common law tradition—developed over centuries by a casu-
istic practice premised on analogic reasoning by means of metaphor and other rhetorical 
tropes—is properly considered a body of knowledge, even though it cannot generate 
uniquely correct results in given cases by means of deduction.”); cf. Lin, supra note 40, at 
1467 (“In contrast, judges and juries tend to be generalists, who lack the scientific compe-
tence to critically assess expert testimony.” (citing Peter S. Menell, The Limitations of Legal 
Institutions for Addressing Environmental Risks, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 100 (1991))). 
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ties.170  Indeed, future empirical studies that I am undertaking may be 
useful for assessing the extent that judicial ideologies affect determi-
nations regarding the uncertainty or certainty of science.  But at least 
an initial review of the issue suggests that in the context of determin-
ing whether the existence of scientific uncertainties warrants judicial 
deference, judges have even fewer traditional constraints on their 
ability to reach ends-oriented judgments. 
Indeed, the Carhart II majority fails to discuss how it and future 
courts are to determine whether certainty exists such that legislative 
options are curtailed.  Instead, its only guidance on the matter is to 
inquire into whether the overall legislative choice is “rational,”171 
which in and of itself sets no standards for any legal determinations 
regarding the existence of uncertainty.  Rather, any inquiry into the 
existence of uncertainty seems centered on the existence of scientific 
consensus on a particular determination as a placeholder for an in-
quiry into the types of scientific uncertainty described earlier.  Such a 
surrogate inquiry may be necessary, because courts are generally 
composed of judges who, as lay people, must evaluate science from 
the outside, albeit with their own expertise in recognizing “conflict-
ing claims, elitist assumptions, unjustified certainty, and a lack of re-
flexivity or self-awareness on the part of experts.”172  The lack of any 
coherent standard, however, leaves considerable room for a court 
that desires to act in an ends-oriented fashion to use a determination 
of the existence of certainty, or uncertainty, to compel a decision to 
uphold, or reverse, a decision.  The availability of ends-oriented de-
terminations regarding uncertainty may even ultimately leech into 
the development of scientific research by creating incentives to char-
acterize scientific issues as “certain” or “uncertain,” depending upon 
whether the probable policy contemplated by a legislature is pre-
ferred or not.  Such an incentive may color scientific discussions of 
knowledge uncertainties, thereby reducing the level of self-criticality 
 
170 See Onstott, supra note 119, at 484 (describing science as “specialized knowledge . . . often 
outside of the realm of judicial experience”). 
171 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1638 (2007); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 422 
(1974). 
172 David S. Caudill, Ibsen’s An Enemy of the People and the Public Understanding of Science in 
Law, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 19 (2003).  For a somewhat less generous approach 
towards the capacity of judges, as lay people, to evaluate science, see Stephen Breyer, In-
troduction to FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1, 4 
(2d ed. 2000) (“[M]ost judges lack the scientific training that might facilitate the evalua-
tion of scientific claims or the evaluation of expert witnesses who make such claims.”). 
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involved with a study.173  And it could lead to even less open discourse 
about the limits of science, misleading the public into continuing to 
make unrealistic demands on science to resolve various policy is-
sues.174 
A number of comprehensive studies of the Supreme Court’s use 
of empirical evidence in general provide even more cause for con-
cern.  As scholars such as Professors David Faigman, Dean Hashi-
moto, and Timothy Zick have found, the Supreme Court’s decision to 
apply empirical tests is often inconsistent, incomplete, and possibly 
ideologically driven.175  Professor Faigman, for example, points out 
that “even a cursory inspection of the Court’s constitutional cases 
demonstrates an uneven use of empirical research.”176  The Supreme 
Court has, for example, rejected empirical data as having little consti-
tutional import without providing any explanation regarding why 
they lack empirical import or elaborating on what facts would have 
such import.177  The Supreme Court has also called for the develop-
ment of empirical studies in earlier cases but failed to apply those 
studies in later cases after those studies have arisen.178 
Professor Faigman uses this inconsistent history to ultimately ar-
gue that the Supreme Court should apply empirical information 
more consistently in order to provide a welcome constraint on its de-
 
173 See Katie Steele, The Precautionary Principle:  A New Approach to Public Decision-Making?, 5 
LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 19, 23 (2006) (arguing that a transparent discussion of uncer-
tainties “promotes a self-critical attitude among scientists, in terms of the judgments and 
practices that are incorporated in their work”). 
174 Cf. Wagner, supra note 29, at 1652–53 (“[T]he public appears to demand almost absolute 
safety from toxic risks, a demand which can be attributed at least in part to a series of bi-
ases that plague the lay person’s perception of risk and are exacerbated by serious defi-
ciencies in the scientific education of the general public.” (footnotes omitted)). 
175 See generally David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”:  Exploring the Empiri-
cal Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991) (examining how 
the Supreme Court’s reliance on empiricism restrains constitutional decisionmaking); 
Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 111 (1997) 
(arguing that the Court’s reliance on empiricism serves primarily as a means of a persua-
sion, not as a significant means of interpretation); Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism:  
Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115 (2003) (arguing that 
the Court’s reliance on empiricism in determining constitutional issues does not provide 
neutrality in interpretation). 
176 Faigman, supra note 175, at 549. 
177 See id. at 581–88 (citing, as examples, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (involving a 
challenge to a death sentence conviction based on disputed psychiatric testimony), and 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (involving a due process challenge to the “voluntary 
commitment” of a child to a state mental hospital)). 
178 See id. at 588–93 (pointing to a number of criminal cases where the Court has suggested 
that empirical research could cause it to revisit its decision, but failed to do so). 
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cisionmaking.179  But Professors Hashimoto and Zick go further to 
suggest that the incoherent use of empirical information by courts, 
which they also both observe,180 may mean that the Court invokes sci-
ence either entirely for rhetorical purposes,181 or to draw attention 
away from a subtle return to legal formalism.182 
While this Article does not attempt to fully resolve this long-
standing debate over whether the Supreme Court is able to apply, 
should apply, or should even purport to apply empirical studies to 
constitutional claims,183 these observations about the Court’s uneven 
history of applying empirical studies suggests that an open-ended 
evaluation of the existence of scientific or medical uncertainty, such 
as that of Carhart II, presents an even greater challenge to interpretive 
consistency.  Uncertainty, as a concept, is even further from the 
Court’s terrain of familiarity than scientific discourse.184  And while 
the Court could make use of a deeper understanding of the differing 
natures of scientific uncertainties, examining, for example, whether 
the pervasiveness of parameter uncertainties means that future re-
search could resolve an issue, or whether the pervasiveness of value 
uncertainty means that such issues can never be fully resolved without 
making a normative judgment at some point in the research proc-
ess,185 there is little evidence that the Court actually engages in this 
sort of inquiry.  As such, the context of scientific uncertainties entails 
an even greater risk that such inquiries will be both engaged in and 
applied inconsistently. 
Finally, the failure of the majority opinion of Carhart II to articu-
late any standard for determining whether the existence of scientific 
uncertainties warrants legislative deference is troublesome for the de-
velopment and discussion of scientific research.  Especially in areas 
such as these, where a legislature has made a finding of certainty, yet 
a court upholds a legislative choice premised on its own finding that 
 
179 See id. at 605–13. 
180 See Hashimoto, supra note 175, at 128–31; Zick, supra note 175, at 145–79. 
181 See Hashimoto, supra note 175, at 152–53. 
182 See Zick, supra note 175, at 195–202. 
183 Instead, in the context of evaluating whether legislatures should receive deference in the 
face of scientific and medical uncertainties, I observe both strengths and weaknesses in al-
lowing courts to make scientific inquiries.  See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
184 See Wagner, supra note 92, at 193 (“[D]etermining the nature and importance 
of . . . various knowledge gaps is an unusually esoteric inquiry, which often depends on an 
expert consensus that is unwritten or even unspoken.  Developing policy on the basis of 
these mixed, science policy issues presents a great challenge to lay decisionmaking.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
185 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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the science is uncertain, researchers are left unable to predict 
whether an open discussion of the uncertainties involved with their 
research would have any legal impact on policy chosen to address 
that problem.186  Instead, researchers might frame their discussion of 
the uncertainties involved in their research in ways supportive of the 
policy choice they prefer, a danger that already exists in the legisla-
tive context,187 but strengthened under the Carhart II approach.  
While this might not ultimately deter researchers from tackling par-
ticular problems, it creates a cloud that could have been avoided 
through a more detailed articulation of the Court’s approach to un-
certainty. 
This ambiguity over the appropriate institution to determine 
whether uncertainty warrants legislative deference was not dictated by 
the case law.  Instead, it may have arisen from the Court’s failure to 
differentiate between cases where legislatures invoked science for the 
purposes of justification, and cases where they used science for pur-
poses of ontological shaping.  In challenges arising in the ontological 
shaping context, the Court has extended an even greater deference 
towards the legislative policy choice than the “wide discretion” ap-
proach taken in Carhart II.  It is likely that the Court’s somewhat con-
tradictory approach towards its capacity to weigh and assess uncer-
tainty stems from its homogeneous incorporation of ontological 
shaping cases alongside cases where science is used as justification. 
For example, in Collins v. Texas,188 also cited by the Carhart II ma-
jority, the Court dealt with a challenge to the application of a legisla-
tive definition of medical practice.  Ira Collins, an osteopath, had 
been convicted of practicing medicine without a license under a stat-
ute which stated that “any person [who] shall be regarded as practis-
ing medicine within the meaning of this act . . . [o]r [those] who 
shall treat or offer to treat any disease or disorder, mental or physical, 
or any physical deformity or injury by any system or method or to ef-
fect cures thereof and charge therefor, directly or indirectly, money 
or other compensation.”189  Collins argued, however, that despite the 
 
186 Cf. Wagner, supra note 29, at 1687 (“A less obvious but nevertheless important conse-
quence of the agencies’ science charade is the failure to provide proper direction or in-
centives for scientific research. . . . Although in some cases the uncertainties can only be 
resolved with policy choices because of the current limitations of scientific knowledge, in 
other cases uncertainties may be capable of being resolved by scientific studies.”). 
187 See Wagner, supra note 92, at 238–45 (arguing that scientists already face a number of dis-
incentives for being open about the limits of their research). 
188 223 U.S. 288 (1912). 
189 Id. at 295. 
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statute’s inclusion of all those who treat diseases for compensation, 
he should have been under no obligation to obtain a medical license 
on the grounds that he did not administer drugs as a medical practi-
tioner would.190  The Court, however, affirmed his conviction, stating 
that because osteopaths purport to treat medical ailments “by scien-
tific manipulation affecting the nerve centres[, i]t is intelligible there-
fore that the State should require of him a scientific training.”191  Fur-
thermore, the state had the right to adopt such a policy even if the 
definitions were in dispute, and even if the definition were “arbitrary 
or irrational,” because the statute’s “only object is to explain who fall 
[sic] within the purview of the act.”192 
The Court took a similar approach in Kansas v. Hendricks,193 where 
the Court addressed the inclusion of “any person who has been con-
victed of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers 
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the 
person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence” 
within the Kansas civil commitment statute.194  Among other argu-
ments, including constitutional due process arguments, Leroy 
Hendricks claimed that “‘mental abnormality’ is not equivalent to 
‘mental illness’”—with “mental illness” being allowable for civil 
commitment under the Court’s case law—given the lack of meaning 
that “mental abnormality” has within the psychiatric community.195  
The Court rejected this argument, explaining that it has “traditionally 
left to legislators the task of defining terms of a medical nature that 
have legal significance.”196 
Hendricks thus more expressly addressed the distinction suggested 
in Collins:  that when it comes to ontological shaping, legislatures 
have considerably greater leeway in choosing definitions for their le-
gal categories, even when the legal categories differ from the scien-
tific and medical categories they resemble.  This greater deference to 
legislative options is warranted in the ontological context because 
these legal categories are intended to operate in a different sphere 
from the science;197 scientific accuracy—much less scientific cer-
 
190 Id. at 296. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
194 Id. at 351–52 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994)). 
195 Id. at 358–59. 
196 Id. at 359. 
197 Cf. United States v. Fifty-Three Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 1982) (up-
holding use of statutory definition of “wild” as creatures “normally found in a wild state” 
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tainty—is less necessary because the scientific determinations are not 
as significant a part of the “rational basis” of the statute.  Moreover, 
additional scientific research would add little, as the Court has rec-
ognized that in such instances the legislature can rationally engage in 
the act of creating its own definitions, rather than in relying upon 
science to support its actions. 
In the justificational context, however, where the legislature is 
purporting to rely upon the science in creating its statutes, scientific 
uncertainty—and the extent of that uncertainty—would seem to 
make a difference in the rationality of the legislature’s choice of pol-
icy options.  But while the Court in Carhart II reached an appropriate 
balance by allowing legislatures latitude to choose options where the 
science is uncertain, it also gave deference to the legislative choice.  
Such deference, where the Court found that the legislature errone-
ously found certainty in the science supporting its actions, and where 
the Court itself acknowledged its own capacity to evaluate the state of 
the certainty by actually doing so,198 is incoherent without further 
elaboration on how courts are to determine whether such certainty 
exists.  What the Court should do, therefore, is outline a more prin-
cipled way for future courts to determine whether the presence of 
scientific uncertainties warrants deference to the policy choices of a 
legislature. 
B.  Approaches Towards Regulatory Findings:  Substantive and Process-Based 
Approaches Towards Science 
As this Article has argued, while some support exists for the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Carhart II to defer to the legislature when it 
takes action in the face of scientific and medical uncertainties,199 the 
Court’s failure to clarify how future courts are to determine whether 
the presence of uncertainties warrant this legislative deference raises 
concerns for accountability in public decisionmaking, consistency in 
judicial decisions, and transparent progress of scientific research.200  
So how can courts develop ways to address uncertainties (and certain-
ties) in the legislative context?  To develop a fuller answer to this 
question, the Court could draw from its own approaches in reviewing 
 
despite evidence presented that the particular parrots at issue could have been domesti-
cated, thereby presenting an example of the permissibility of divergence between statu-
tory, but ontologically-shaped, definitions and those purported to reflect scientific use). 
198 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1636 (2007). 
199 See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
200 See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
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agency decisions where the science used to support the agency’s 
choice was arguably uncertain.  The Supreme Court has approached 
such questions more along the substantive and explicative lines de-
scribed earlier by engaging in further substantive or procedural in-
quiry into the agency’s decision. 
1.  Constitutional Avoidance and Other Substantive Considerations 
The Court’s treatment of potential uncertainties—both scientific 
and other factual uncertainties—in the Commerce Clause context il-
lustrates a substantive approach towards the treatment of scientific 
uncertainty.  Although such challenges often involve scientific and 
medical uncertainties regarding the connection between an agency’s 
action and interstate commerce, the Court does not take the Carhart 
II approach of generally deferring to an institution’s choice of op-
tions in the face of such uncertainties.  Rather, the Court has resolved 
such challenges by focusing on substantive constitutional concerns 
raised by the agency decisions, rather than looking to the weight of 
the science itself or the capacities of institutions in making the cer-
tainty determination at issue. 
In two decisions—Rapanos v. United States201 and Solid Waste Agency 
of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers 
(“SWANCC”)202—the Court, among other things, applied a statutory 
canon of interpretation to the decisions of the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers to exercise jurisdiction over wetlands under the Clean Wa-
ter Act.  Although scientific information was provided by both parties 
regarding the hydrological connection (or lack thereof) between 
those wetlands and both “waters of the United States”—the language 
of the Clean Water Act203—and to interstate commerce, the Court’s 
plurality in Rapanos and majority in SWANCC focused on a statutory 
canon as its primary guide.204  As the Court in SWANCC explained, 
applying the Corps’ regulations would raise serious questions of Con-
gress’s authority under the Commerce Clause in light of the states’ 
 
201 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
202 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
203 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000) (defining “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United 
States, including the territorial seas”); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000) (prohibiting the 
discharge of pollutants in general); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2000) (authorizing the Corps to 
“issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, . . . notwithstanding section 1311(a) of 
this title”); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000) (defining discharge as including “any addition of 
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source”). 
204 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737–38; SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. 
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traditional power over land-use regulation.205  The Court suggested 
that it found the regulation constitutionally troublesome, although 
the dissent pointed to the existence of scientific evidence attesting to 
the connection between regulation of the types of wetlands at issue 
and migratory birds.206  Similarly, in Rapanos, the plurality found that 
substantive concerns over Congress’s infringement of traditional state 
powers weighed against deferring to the U.S. Army Corps’ decisions 
to apply the Clean Water Act to permit requirements to wetlands in-
termittently connected to navigable waters.207  Under these decisions, 
the statutes should not be interpreted as “result[ing] in a significant 
impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land 
and water use”208 unless Congress had provided a “clear and manifest” 
statement to authorize such an intrusion.209  This is in contrast to 
Carhart II, where uncertainty in the medical and health context was 
held to require deference to legislative choice of options, despite 
constitutional considerations about the health of pregnant women. 
In other Commerce Clause cases, too, the Court has resolved legal 
challenges using substantive considerations despite what seem to be 
contravening natural and social science evidence—that is, uncer-
tainty, at least in the manner that courts use the term—about the 
connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce.  
For example, in United States v. Lopez,210 the Court overturned Con-
gress’s attempt to protect the health of children in schools through 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which forbade “any individ-
ual knowingly to possess a firearm . . . at a place that [he] knows, or 
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.”211  Although the 
empirical information was arguably “uncertain,” and although Con-
gress was purporting to address a health risk, the Court nevertheless 
rejected Congress’s choice of options when confronted with a consti-
tutional challenge.  As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, “re-
ports, hearings, and other readily available literature” attested to both 
the “widespread and extremely serious” nature of the “problem of 
guns in and around schools”212 and to the “the link between secon-
 
205 531 U.S. at 174. 
206 Id. at 194 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
207 547 U.S. at 737–38. 
208 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. 
209 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738. 
210 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
211 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000). 
212 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 619 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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dary education and business.”213  But rather than giving any weight to 
such social science information and deferring to Congress’s attempt 
to address economic safety concerns in the presence of such uncer-
tainties, the Court determined that “[t]he possession of a gun in a lo-
cal school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, 
through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate 
commerce.”214 
Some might regard the differences between the approach taken 
in the Commerce Clause cases and that taken in Carhart II as mislead-
ing.  After all, in neither the Clean Water Act nor the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act did Congress point towards the “certainty” of the 
science in support of its decisions, as Congress did in the Partial Birth 
Abortion Act.  Indeed, much of the social science evidence provided 
to the Court in Lopez through the parties and amici in support of the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act was never before Congress originally.215  
Yet the same could be said about the lack of consideration that the 
state gave to the nature of alcohol addiction as a disease in the statute 
addressed in Powell216 and the dangers of compulsory vaccination in 
the statute addressed in Jacobson.217  Moreover, the deference given in 
Carhart II stemmed from the Court’s own independent determination 
that medical uncertainty existed regarding the nature of the health 
risks at issue such that the legislative option warranted deference—a 
determination that seems available with respect to both wetlands and 
their connection with waters of the United States, and handguns and 
their connection with adverse economic effects as well.  This under-
scores how a decision to overturn or uphold an attempt to address 
risks to public health and the environment could be subsumed in an 
inconsistent and under-theorized judicial approach to determining 
whether or not scientific certainty exists. 
Indeed, some of these tensions were acknowledged by Justice 
Thomas in Carhart II.  As he explained in his concurrence, his deci-
sion to join the majority in Carhart II was premised on his belief that 
the Court’s current abortion jurisprudence has no basis in the Con-
stitution, rather than because he believed that Congress’s choice of 
 
213 Id. at 620. 
214 Id. at 567. 
215 See id. at 563 (“But to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate 
the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate 
commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are 
lacking here.”). 
216 See 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968). 
217 See 197 U.S. 11, 21–22 (1905). 
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action warranted some sort of deference.218  He also stated, however, 
that his concurrence was not to be taken as support for Congress’s 
authority to regulate D & X under the Commerce Clause.219  This 
statement emphasizes some of the tensions raised by the Carhart II 
majority opinion with the Commerce Clause jurisprudence described 
above. 
More similar to the Carhart II approach is Justice Kennedy’s con-
currence in Rapanos, which, as the narrowest common ground in the 
opinion, some regard as the holding of Rapanos.220  It is similar to 
Carhart II in the sense that Justice Kennedy suggests that, given the 
different sorts of scientific findings available in this context, scientific 
support, if made in the appropriate circumstances, could provide 
grounds for a court to defer to a decision made by another institu-
tion.  He seems to extend, however, the scope of such institutions 
that might receive deference regarding their choice of actions in the 
face of scientific uncertainty to include both trial courts and agen-
cies.221  And although his opinion does not explicitly reference scien-
tific uncertainties, his discussion regarding the science before the 
Court suggests that his decision was made with consideration of un-
certainties in mind. 
In particular, Justice Kennedy pointed towards scientific evidence 
regarding the hydrological connection between intermittent wet-
 
218 See Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
219 Id. 
220 Currently, circuit courts are split over which Rapanos opinion provides the controlling 
definition of the term “navigable waters.”  Compare United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 
1208, 1219–21 (11th Cir. 2007) (describing circuit split, but ultimately holding that the 
concurrence of Justice Kennedy controls Rapanos), and N. Cal. River Watch v. City of 
Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the concurrence of 
Justice Kennedy controls Rapanos), and United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 
723, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2006) (same), with United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (noting that because the dissent in Rapanos would have found jurisdiction un-
der either the plurality test or the test in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, “the United 
States may elect to prove jurisdiction under either test” (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 
n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting))).  See generally Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the 
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 
(1976))). 
221 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Through regulations or adju-
dication, the Corps may choose to identify categories of tributaries that, due to their vol-
ume of flow (either annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or other 
relevant considerations, are significant enough that wetlands adjacent to them are likely, 
in the majority of cases, to perform important functions for an aquatic system incorporat-
ing navigable waters.”). 
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lands, such as those at issue in Rapanos, and health effects, discussing 
how “nutrient-rich runoff from the Mississippi River has created a hy-
poxic, or oxygen-depleted, ‘dead zone’ in the Gulf of Mexico that at 
times approaches the size of Massachusetts and New Jersey,” and how 
“[s]cientific evidence indicates that wetlands play a critical role in 
controlling and filtering runoff.”222  Rather than interpreting the 
Clean Water Act facially to avoid intrusion into state regulatory au-
thority over water,223 as the plurality would have done, Kennedy would 
have remanded the decision to the district court to weigh the science 
regarding the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands at 
issue and navigable waters.224  He also raised the possibility that in the 
future, the Corps itself could promulgate more specific regulations 
that would satisfy his concerns about the establishment of the neces-
sary significant nexus.225 
The approach of Justice Kennedy in his Rapanos concurrence, if 
taken in other Commerce Clause cases addressing risks to human 
health and the environment, would seem to put them more in line 
with the jurisprudence of Carhart II and other legislative deference 
cases.  But even following an analogous approach in cases involving 
scientific uncertainties in the legislative context is not enough to pro-
vide adequate guidance to future courts.  Justice Kennedy’s concur-
rence still leaves open the issue of how courts are to determine 
whether the U.S. Army Corps has provided information regarding the 
connection between either a specific wetland at issue in an enforce-
ment action or the given wetlands addressed in a rulemaking regard-
ing the scope of its enforcement authority sufficient to warrant defer-
ence.  This open issue, of course, could be and is being addressed by 
lower courts experimenting with various standards of determina-
tion.226  But these gaps mean that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
 
222 Id. at 777. 
223 Id. at 783 (“The possibility of legitimate Commerce Clause and federalism concerns in 
some circumstances does not require the adoption of an interpretation that departs in all 
cases from the Act’s text and structure.”). 
224 Id. (“[T]he end result in these cases and many others to be considered by the Corps may 
be the same as that suggested by the dissent, namely, that the Corps’ assertion of jurisdic-
tion is valid.  Given, however, that neither the agency nor the reviewing courts properly 
considered the issue, a remand is appropriate, in my view, for application of the control-
ling standard.”). 
225 Id. at 782. 
226 See, e.g., United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007) (remanding a case 
on appeal back to the trial court to provide instructions to the jury that “a water can be 
considered ‘navigable’ under the [Clean Water Act] only if it possesses a ‘significant 
nexus’ to waters that ‘are or were navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made” 
(quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring)); N. Cal. River Watch v. City 
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alone cannot provide guidance for determining how to evaluate the 
existence of sufficient scientific uncertainty to support deference to a 
legislative choice.  A fuller discussion is still warranted on how to re-
solve whether or not uncertainty exists such that legislative deference 
is warranted. 
2.  Procedural Approaches and Providing Reasonable Explanations 
What I call the Court’s procedural approach towards the treat-
ment of scientific uncertainty seems more promising in providing 
guidance for the evaluation of scientific uncertainty.  Massachusetts v. 
EPA227 illustrates this approach.  In that case, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed a challenge by a group of states to the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency’s (“EPA”) decision to reject their petition to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under the Clean 
Air Act’s endangerment provision.  That provision stated: 
The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to 
time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards 
applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of 
new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment 
cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be antici-
pated to endanger public health or welfare.228 
The EPA had based its rejection of the states’ petition both on the 
ground that it lacked authority to regulate in this area, and also on 
the ground that if it did have such authority, any decision to set 
greenhouse gas emission standards would not be wise because no 
causal link between increased anthropogenic emissions of green-
house gases and the increase in global surface air temperatures had 
been unequivocally established.229  This latter argument could be read 
as either an argument that existing scientific uncertainty cut in favor 
of not regulating at that time, or that in the face of scientific uncer-
 
of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 1000–01 (9th Cir. 2007) (determining that the U.S. Army 
Corps presented sufficient information to establish jurisdiction when it presented infor-
mation that an actual surface connection existed between the water at issue and a naviga-
ble-in-fact water, an underground hydraulic connection between the two bodies, signifi-
cant ecological connection between the two bodies, and a chemical connection between 
the two bodies).  Scientists are also attempting to address these gaps.  See, e.g., Scott G. 
Leibowitz et al., Non-Navigable Streams and Adjacent Wetlands:  Addressing Science Needs Fol-
lowing the Supreme Court’s Rapanos Decision, 6 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & ENV’T 364, 364–71 
(2008) (proposing metrics to help determine whether waters are protected under the 
Clean Water Act in light of the Rapanos decision). 
227 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
228 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000). 
229 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1450–51. 
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tainty, an agency should receive at least an additional degree of def-
erence towards its decisions.  The EPA supported this defense by 
pointing to the concerns that regulating greenhouse gases would 
hinder the President’s negotiating position with developing nations 
for greenhouse gas reductions, and that any attempt to regulate new 
vehicle emissions would be inefficient and piecemeal.230 
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments of the EPA,231 but its 
holding on EPA’s discretion is more relevant to this Article.  Al-
though the Court recognized that agencies should have considerable 
discretion to postpone decisionmaking to a different time, the Court 
found that the reasons that the EPA had actually provided for post-
poning actions were invalid under the Clean Air Act.  Rather than 
take the approach of Carhart II of deferring to the government’s deci-
sion to choose options in the face of scientific uncertainty, the Court 
held that the EPA’s choice was constrained and that the EPA’s deci-
sion, at least on the grounds that it provided, exceeded those con-
straints.  In particular, the Court stated that the policy rationales 
raised by the agency conflicted with the considerations allowable un-
der the Clean Air Act, which were limited to the extent to which 
greenhouse gas emissions endangered public health and welfare.232  
In the Court’s words, the policy rationales put forth by the EPA were 
“reason[s] divorced from the statutory text.”233  This holding points to 
a vision of agencies as implementers of Congress’s policy choices, 
rather than as independent policymaking bodies themselves. 
Moreover, the Court held that the EPA was required to articulate 
the basis for its choice of action, stating that: 
Under the clear terms of the Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid taking further 
action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to 
climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it 
cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.234 
Only if the uncertainty in the science were so extreme as to preclude 
an endangerment finding would the EPA be able to avoid action on 
the grounds of uncertainty.235  Moreover, any such use of uncertainty 
as a ground for inaction must be clearly stated:  “If the scientific un-
certainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from making a rea-
soned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global 
 
230 Id. at 1462–63. 
231 See id. 
232 Id. at 1462 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000)). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 1463. 
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warming, EPA must say so.”236  Without such an explanation regarding 
the nature of the uncertainty, the Court would consider the agency’s 
decision “arbitrary” and “capricious” in violation of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.237 
This articulation approach is useful for judicial evaluation of 
agency actions by eliciting information helpful for courts in assessing 
an agency’s decision.238  One of the premises behind deference to 
agencies is an understanding that agencies, like legislatures, are ex-
posed to a wider variety of scientific information than courts and can 
independently obtain information without relying on the parties be-
fore them.239  Furthermore, agencies are understood to have more 
experience with issues in their purview, and more dedicated scientific 
staff and researchers than even legislatures.240  But agencies also face 
the constraint of operating under authorizing statutes enacted by leg-
islatures.  Thus, in reviewing an agency decision, a court faces the 
secondary inquiry of determining whether an agency’s use of its dis-
cretion falls within the bounds of that authorizing statute or not, 
through the two-part Chevron test described earlier.241 
 
236 Id. 
237 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2000); see EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1463. 
238 See Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration:  How Chevron Mis-
conceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 710–11 (2007) 
(arguing that Massachusetts v. EPA provides a welcome return to approaching agencies as 
experts on technical matters, rather than as merely statutory interpreters). 
239 See Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve the Legislative Process:  Can It Be 
Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L. & POL. 105, 145 (1997).  Agencies, however, may be 
more susceptible to systematic influence and bias given their relative permanence and 
exposure to “lobbying, propaganda, graft, and influence.”  KOMESAR, supra note 11, at 
182. 
240 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines:  Tackling Information Deficits in Envi-
ronmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1422 (2008) (suggesting that expert govern-
ment agencies have significant resources, but arguing that they should devote more of 
those resources to undertaking studies necessary to fill in data gaps); Lin, supra note 40, 
at 1467 (“Administrative agencies are likely better suited than courts to determine the op-
timal level of deterrence because agencies possess the in-house expertise to evaluate the 
complex and conflicting scientific evidence in environmental tort cases.  In contrast, 
judges and juries tend to be generalists, who lack the scientific competence to critically 
assess expert testimony.” (footnote omitted)); Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach 
to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?:  Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better 
than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1278–90 (1996) (describing the 
competence of agencies in evaluating scientific questions); see also Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984) (justifying deference to 
agency interpretations of statutes concerning matters subject to regulation on the basis 
that agencies have superior understanding of such matters). 
241 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
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Requiring additional explanation, therefore, allows a court to re-
ceive the sorts of information helpful for engaging in that inquiry in-
to whether an agency has acted within its bounds.  The existence of 
scientific uncertainty might be relevant to such an inquiry, but only to 
the extent that it relates to the factors set forth in the statute itself, 
which may or may not explicitly or implicitly include the uncertainty 
of the science.  Indeed, these statutory factors may be viewed as pre-
liminary policy choices—deserving of deference under Carhart II—by 
legislatures to select policy options in the face of uncertainty.  In 
other words, Congress may create normative considerations—such as 
the importance of clean air—that agencies are to evaluate despite the 
presence of some degree of scientific uncertainty.  This subsidiary 
role of the agency is recognized in Massachusetts v. EPA by virtue of its 
holding that only “profound” uncertainty described by the EPA 
would be sufficient to avoid application of those statutory factors.242 
The articulation approach applied by the Court for the EPA’s de-
cision is still instructive in the legislative context.  Although Congress 
does not face the same constraints as agencies, which operate under 
legislative mandates, it still has some bounds—namely the bounds of 
the Constitution and court decisions interpreting the Constitution.  
Thus, where constitutional concerns arise regarding the basis for a 
legislature’s decisions, an articulation approach can still provide 
some utility.  As with the question of whether an agency is operating 
under its statutory constraints, an articulation approach can aid 
courts in evaluating whether a legislature is operating under its con-
stitutional constraints.  But such an approach, especially in light of 
the deference due to legislatures given their additional fact-finding 
capacities, fulfilled or not, should be more limited.  In particular, I 
suggest that by requiring Congress to articulate whether it is acting in 
an area of scientific certainty, and providing a brief discussion of the 
nature of uncertainties involved, a court can more fully evaluate 
whether the constitutional limitations are being approached by the 
legislatures themselves.243 
 
242 See 127 S. Ct. at 1463. 
243 Such an approach would differ from that of courts towards evidence in cases involving 
evidentiary admissions standards in individual common law claims or as-applied statutory 
or regulatory challenges.  See Davis, supra note 5, at 365 (arguing that evidentiary stan-
dards before agencies and courts should differ, pointing out that “[e]vidence rules predi-
cated on the assumed inexpertness of judges and juries in specialized fields cannot be 
transferred blindly to adjudicators who are specialists”); Holly Doremus, Data Gaps in 
Natural Resource Management:  Sniffing for Leaks Along the Information Pipeline, 83 IND. L.J. 
407, 441 (2008) (arguing that traditional concerns embodied in rules of evidence are not 
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Such a requirement, however, appears absent in Carhart II, where 
Congress not only failed to make findings about the existence or na-
ture of the scientific uncertainty, but even treated the science as cer-
tain.244  While the Court itself made a finding that the area in which 
the legislature was acting involved medical uncertainties,245 the Court 
failed to provide any guidance to lower courts for how to determine 
whether such uncertainty exists and how much certainty is needed in 
order for legislatures to deserve any heightened deference. 
Requiring a legislature, which wants to receive deference for its 
actions, to articulate at the least that it was acting in an area of scien-
tific or medical uncertainty regarding the support for its actions 
would address some of the transparency problems described earlier 
in this Article.  Rather than allowing a legislature to receive deference 
for its normative choices despite using the “charade” of scientific cer-
tainty,246 a legislature that bases its choice of action on challengeable 
scientific support would have to be open about the fact that its ac-
tions were not dictated by science alone, but were instead normative 
choices made in the face of uncertain science.  Legislative debate 
could then focus less on the merits of the scientific studies, and in-
stead be acknowledged as debates over values (albeit one informed by 
the science)—a debate in which the public is more able to take 
part.247  Moreover, legislatures would have additional incentives to in-
 
applicable in an agency context, where the agency is an expert body and capable of giving 
the appropriate weight to expert testimony and documents).  While such hearings involve 
individual disputes (and future similar disputes, given the application of stare decisis), fa-
cial challenges to statutes or regulations embroil courts in more polycentric matters.  See 
Flournoy, supra note 2, at 368; Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 353, 394 (1978).  See generally Davis, supra note 241, at 365 (arguing that 
evidentiary standards before agencies and courts should differ).  Both statutes and regu-
lations apply broadly to large classes of parties, from criminals convicted under various 
statutes to industries engaging in regulated activities.  Thus, while scientific determina-
tions made regarding the admissibility of certain types of expert testimony may affect the 
parties in a case, or even future similarly situated parties, they have less effect than if such 
determinations were made regarding the scientific underpinnings of statutes or regula-
tions. 
244 127 S. Ct. at 1638. 
245 Id. 
246 See Wagner, supra note 29, at 1674–77 (1995) (arguing that overreliance on scientific ra-
tionales by agencies in setting standards can create a barrier to public, democratic par-
ticipation). 
247 See Wagner, supra note 92, at 228 (“If the questions ripe for public debate are perceived 
to be scientific or technical in nature, laypersons may not know how or where policy in-
put is needed.”). 
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form both themselves and the public about the limitations of sci-
ence.248 
Providing deference to legislative decisions only when the legisla-
ture has acknowledged it was acting in an area of scientific uncer-
tainty would also address concerns that an open-ended inquiry into 
the existence of uncertainty would allow judicial bias to play a signifi-
cant role in determining whether deference towards a legislative 
choice is warranted.  An articulation requirement could constrain 
courts from substituting their own possibly biased determinations of 
uncertainty; instead, courts would first inquire into whether the legis-
lature was sufficiently open about the uncertainties in the scientific or 
medical support for their choice of action.  This does not mean that a 
court could never reevaluate the reasonableness249 of the legislature’s 
actions or the adequacy of its support.  The requirement would sim-
ply mean that a court would apply a less deferential standard of re-
view when a legislature has failed to articulate that its actions were 
based on a choice taken in the face of uncertain science.250 
Finally, a limited articulation requirement would be more conso-
nant with the uncertainties involved with scientific research discussed 
earlier in this Article.251  Rather than treating uncertainty as either ex-
isting or not, it would recognize the variety of ways in which scientific 
 
248 See id. at 269–74 (“Over time, however, as federal lawmakers who are willing to be edu-
cated become more knowledgeable about the limits of science, it will be increasingly dif-
ficult for members of Congress to remain blissfully ignorant of the knowledge gaps or for 
scientifically sophisticated legislators to exploit the ignorance of their colleagues.” (foot-
note omitted)). 
249 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983) (evaluating the reasonableness of 
Congress’s determination that a finding of insanity at a criminal trial is sufficient to justify 
commitment). 
250 Skeptics of this proposal might argue that legislatures would respond to such an articula-
tion requirement by simply defaulting to claims of scientific uncertainty.  Even were legis-
latures to do so, such statements would still have the positive effect of bringing normative 
deliberations out into the open, rather than having them subsumed by discussions of sci-
entific bases.  See Wagner, supra note 29, at 1674–77.  It would also combat the current 
“use” of claims of uncertainty by legislators as reasons for delay, rather than to initiate ac-
tion.  See Wagner, supra note 92, at 229–31. 
   This is merely an initial proposal to tackle some of the concerns raised by Carhart II.  
It is possible, of course, that in time such legislative references to uncertainty would be-
come so prevalent as to create significant barriers to judicial review.  If this should hap-
pen, courts may have to develop more sophisticated ways of examining the role of scien-
tific uncertainty in the decisionmaking process, drawing for guidance, perhaps, from the 
developing literature for institutional decisionmaking under uncertainty.  See, e.g., 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, WORKSHOP SUMMARY, 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SCIENCES DECISION MAKING:  RISK MANAGEMENT, EVIDENCE, AND 
ETHICS 21–33 (2009). 
251 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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uncertainties can arise in a given legal or policy problem and require 
a legislature to provide its own evaluation of the scientific and medi-
cal uncertainties relevant to its decision.252  It may turn out that legis-
latures, if required to do so in order to receive deference, will elabo-
rate further on the nature of the relevant uncertainties, be they more 
measurement-related or variability-related.  This, in turn, will educate 
courts further about sources of uncertainty and allow them at least to 
begin to address uncertainty in a more sophisticated manner, rather 
than subsuming it all under one category.  This approach would also 
enhance the dialogue between courts, legislatures, and the scientific 
community.  If legislatures were urged to explain how they chose to 
factor in the relevant scientific uncertainties into their decisions,253 
then scientific researchers would have a better idea of both the im-
pact of their findings, as well as relevant areas in which further re-
search would aid legislatures. 
Finally, a limited articulation approach would balance some of the 
concerns raised by critics of legislative deference.  As described ear-
lier, courts, as lay institutions, should be even more hesitant to make 
determinations regarding the nature or non-existence of uncertainty 
when addressing facial challenges to statutes or regulations.254  An ar-
ticulation approach would accommodate such developments by em-
phasizing that the court’s decision was based on the legislature’s ar-
ticulated understanding of the science and its uncertainties at the 
time of the decision, rather than inadvertently fixing into place judi-
cial understandings that would remain stagnant as scientific research 
progresses.255 
IV.  EXPLORING ADDITIONAL WAYS TO APPROACH A MORE 
COMPREHENSIVE ARTICULATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF SCIENTIFIC 
CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY 
As I have argued, the Supreme Court’s approach in Massachusetts 
v. EPA can provide a starting point for the Court to address some of 
 
252 Cf. Beecher-Monas, supra note 31, at 1656–57 (urging courts to be more explicit in dis-
cussing their unstated scientific assumptions, thereby providing scientific and intellectual 
“due process”). 
253 Cf. id. (urging a similar sort of articulation requirement for courts themselves in the con-
text of tort litigation). 
254 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
255 Cf. Wagner, supra note 92, at 276–78 (arguing that greater deference to agencies would 
reduce the overemphasis of legislation on scientific support, thereby allowing more space 
for creative administrative approaches to address environmental problems). 
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the concerns raised by Carhart II for public accountability, consistent 
judicial decisionmaking, and the openness of scientific research.  
While the Court has support for its decision to defer to legislative 
choices in the face of scientific and medical uncertainties, it fails to 
provide guidance to future courts on how to assess the existence of 
sufficient uncertainty.  Following a limited articulation approach and 
requiring legislatures to at least acknowledge and discuss the uncer-
tainties involved with the scientific support for their actions could 
provide a starting point for addressing some of these problems.  
Moreover, it would better harmonize the Supreme Court’s case law 
regarding legislative decisions to address health and environmental 
issues with other cases addressing scientific uncertainty in the admin-
istrative decisionmaking context and provide a more meaningful way 
for courts, legislatures, and agencies to interact with developing sci-
entific research. 
I have mostly focused on ways for the Court to reform its ap-
proach to scientific uncertainty to improve the dialogue between 
courts, legislatures, the public, and the scientific community.  But leg-
islatures and the scientific community can play roles enhancing this 
dialogue as well.  Legislatures could be more open about the scien-
tific support behind their actions.  This could mean drawing from the 
scientific literature on the kinds of scientific uncertainties that exist,256 
taking into account the nature of the uncertainties relevant to sup-
porting their actions.  This could mean evaluating whether the un-
certainties posed by a given problem involve uncertainties that could 
be resolved through additional research and technological develop-
ment, as epistemological uncertainties may be, or whether the uncer-
tainties are deeper or more inherent and may never be resolved, as 
variability uncertainties may be.  It could also mean recognizing that 
some research uncertainties come from uncertainties in normative 
choices made in the context of research itself.  And it could involve 
discussing and explicitly weighing whether the risk posed by a given 
problem is so great that it would be unfeasible to wait for further re-
search before taking action. 
Legislatures could also begin to draft statutes specifically taking 
uncertainties into account such that implementers, such as adminis-
trative agencies, and courts have different options in the face of dif-
 
256 See generally Weiss, supra note 22, at 25 (providing a proposed “scale” of scientific uncer-
tainties drawing from existing legal terminology and complimentary Bayesian statistics). 
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fering degrees and types of uncertainties.257  This not only would pro-
vide further support for the reasonability of a legislature’s actions, 
but would also create some middle ground between action and inac-
tion in the face of varying degrees and types of uncertainties.  It 
would also create ways for agencies to provide additional relevant in-
formation, developed through their greater numbers of dedicated 
staff and resources, to the legislature for future efforts on a given 
problem. 
Finally, the scientific community can become more engaged in 
discourse with courts and legislatures regarding the uncertainties and 
limitations in their research.  This could be done through greater 
communication regarding the general nature of scientific uncertain-
ties with legislatures and the public,258 perhaps through groups such 
as the American Association for the Advancement of Science.259  It 
could also be done through a more accessible discussion of scientific 
uncertainties in policy-relevant scientific articles.  And it could be 
done through amicus briefs to courts explaining both the limitations 
of scientific uncertainties as well as the contextually relevant sci-
ence.260 
Making societal decisions in the face of scientific and medical un-
certainty is difficult.  Scientific and medical uncertainties, however, 
arise in numerous areas of societal concern, including abortion regu-
lation, environmental and public health regulation, and criminal 
punishment.  The Supreme Court’s attempt to tackle this problem in 
Carhart II is welcome.  Yet further clarification is still needed to create 
sufficient incentives for courts, legislatures, the public, and the scien-
tific community to engage in an open dialogue about the role of sci-
entific uncertainties in societal decisions.  Providing deference to leg-
islatures only when they at least articulate that their actions were 
taken in the face of scientific uncertainty, rather than based on scien-
tific certainty, would be a helpful first step in enhancing this dia-
logue. 
 
257 See Flournoy, supra note 2, at 386–89 (arguing that Congress could draft environmental 
statutes specifically to provide different available options to agencies when they face dif-
ferent degrees of scientific uncertainties). 
258 See Wagner, supra note 92, at 273–75. 
259 See American Association for the Advancement of Science, About AAAS, http://www.aaas. 
org/aboutaaas. 
260 See Tai, supra note 91, at 838. 

